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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a complete
list of the parties named in the federal district court action is as follows:
Plaintiffs
Emily Egbert and Jerad Egbert, individually and as guardians for J.E., a minor.
Defendant
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., a Japanese corporation.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented were certified by the United States District Court for the
District of Utah. (AOB at Addendum A.) This court considers certified questions in
light of the facts of the case in which the questions are certified. Richardson v. Navistar
IntT Transp. Corp., 2000 UT 65ffi[8-9,8 P.3d 263 (noting question as phrased was rather
ambiguous and therefore giving answer only with respect to specific facts of case at
hand); see also Hirpa v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 948 P.2d 785, 787 n.l (Utah 1997) (selecting
version of questions that better characterized legal issues to be resolved in case at hand).
Therefore, Nissan describes the second question certified in the context of the facts of
this case.
Issue 1: Whether Utah Code section 78-15-6(3) is unconstitutional.
Issue 2: Whether Utah recognizes Restatement (3d) of Torts: Products Liability
§16(b)-(d) where one plaintiff is an active tortfeasor and the additional plaintiffs are part
of the same economic unit, giving the active tortfeasor an incentive to claim that it is
unclear which damages can be attributed to the alleged passive tortfeasor.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Certified questions of law are reviewed for correctness. Scott v. Hammock, 870
P.2d 947, 949 (Utah 1994).
PRESERVATION
These issues were preserved in trial court motions and memoranda, pre-trial
conferences, and the jury instruction conference. (R. 29, 57, 90, 93, 97-98, 306-07, 69195, 712, 731-36, 573-98, 658-66, 668-89.)
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STATUTES AND RULES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
Products Liability Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(3).
Liability Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 to-43.
Copies of these statutes are attached at Addenda A and B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

The Accident

In March of 2002, plaintiffs Jerad and Emily Egbert (the "Egberts") were involved
in an automobile accident on 1-15 between Cedar City and St. George, Utah. Egbert v.
Nissan Motor Co, Ltd., 2007 UT 64, 1|2, 167 P.3d 1058 ("Egbert I"). While trying to
avoid a slower-moving vehicle, Jerad Egbert lost control of his 1998 Nissan Altima
causing it to leave the roadway and roll approximately three times. Id. The driver, Jerad
Egbert, wore a seat belt, and the Egbert's two-year-old son, Cade, was properly restrained
in a child seat. Neither received significant injuries. (R. 41,421.) Emily Egbert, Jerad's
pregnant wife, was not using her seat belt and was ejected through the front passenger
window as the car rolled. Egbert, 2007 UT 64 at f3; (R. 349.) Emily Egbert suffered a
broken pelvis, injuries to her bladder, abrasions and contusions. Egbert, 2007 UT 64 at
^[3. Her child, Janessa Egbert, was delivered by emergency C-section following the
accident. IcL Janessa Egbert has a serious brain injury. Id. The parties dispute whether
and to what extent the ejection proximately caused Janessa's brain injury. IdL
B.

The Parties' Claims and Defenses

The Egberts brought products liability claims against Nissan North America, Inc.,
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., and Central Glass Co., Ltd., ("Nissan") for strict liability and
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negligence. LI at f4. The Egberts do not claim that any action or omission on the part
of Nissan caused the accident. Instead, they assert that the 1998 Altima was defective in
design and unreasonably dangerous because the Altima's -side window glass did not
prevent Emily from being ejected during the rollover. Id The Egberts have described
their products liability theory as one of "crashworthiness" or "enhanced injury." They
assert that Emily would not have been ejected had the vehicle been designed with side
windows made of framed laminated glass, rather than tempered safety glass. Id. The
Egberts also contend that had Emily not been ejected, her injuries would have been less
serious, and Janessa would not have suffered a brain injury. Id. Plaintiff Jerad Egbert
has also made an affirmative claim for loss of consortium.
Nissan denies it was responsible in any way for the accident or injuries. Id. at ^|5.
Jerad Egbert wras inattentive and lost control of the car, causing the accident and the
resulting injuries.

Nissan argues that the car was not defective or unreasonably

dangerous, that it was not negligent with respect to the design and manufacture of the car,
including the choice of tempered safety glass, and that the tempered safety glass was not
a proximate cause of any of the alleged injuries, [d. Moreover, Nissan asserts that Emily
would not have been contained within the vehicle during this severe rollover accident
even if the Altima's side windows had contained laminated glass, instead of tempered
safety glass. Id.
Notably, all passenger cars manufactured in the United States in 1997—when the
Egbert's Altima was manufactured and sold—used tempered safety glass in front side

1

Nissan North America, Inc. and Central Glass Co., Ltd. were dismissed during pre-trial
proceedings.
4

windows. (R. 42). The tempered safety glass installed in the moveable side windows of
the 1998 Nissan Altima met the applicable federal glazing requirements set forth in
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 205 ("FMVSS 205"),
C.

Prior Certification to this Court
On May 6, 2006, Judge Cassell certified two questions to this court: (1) whether

the jury is to be instructed on the presumption of non-defectiveness that arises in Nissan's
favor under Utah Code section 78-15-6(3) and what evidentiary burden is required to
overcome the presumption; and (2) whether Utah law recognizes a "crashworthiness" or
"enhanced injury" theory of products liability, as outlined in section 16(a) of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts. On August 24, 2007, this court found that the jury should
be instructed on section 78-15-6(3)'s rebuttable presumption of nondefectiveness and that
section 16(a) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts Products Liability, the enhanced injury
theory of products liability, applies in Utah.
Judge Benson has now certified two additional issues to the court—whether Utah
Code section 78-15-6(3) is constitutional, and who should bear the burden of proving that
the Egberts' injuries were indeed enhanced by the alleged defect in the Altima's
passenger side window glass.2 (AOB at Addendum A.)

In Egbert I, this court declined to address the burden of proof required in an enhanced
injury case as this issue was not specifically certified.
5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On the first issue—whether section 78-15-6(3) is constitutional—Nissan asserts
that the particular subsection is constitutional, and Utah law supports that finding. On the
second issue—who has the burden of proving what damages, if any, were caused by a
defect in the Altima—Nissan contends that the Egberts should have the burden of
proving all aspects of their case, including enhanced injuries.
Utah Code section 78-15-6(3), part of the Utah Product Liability Act ("UPLA"), is
not unconstitutional.

In Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, this court held that a

different section of the UPLA—Utah Code section 78-15-3—was an unconstitutional
statute of repose. 717 P.2d 670, 681-85 (Utah 1985). This court then determined that the
remainder of the statute was invalid, not because the other sections were themselves
unconstitutional, but because they could not be severed from the offending provision. Id.
at 686. Utah Code section 78-15-6(3) is no more unconstitutional now than it was at the
time Berry was decided; and the Egberts do not seriously contend otherwise.
Instead, the Egberts argue that section 78-15-6(3) is invalid because it was not
properly reenacted. Assuming the court addresses this distinct question, the Egberts'
argument fails. The legislature and this court have implicitly recognized for decades that
under Utah law when a court declares a non-severable statutory scheme invalid because
one section is unconstitutional, the legislature can make the entire statutory scheme valid
by fixing the specific constitutional defect. This is precisely what happened when the
legislature amended section 78-15-3 in 1989 by replacing the unconstitutional statute of
repose with a statute of limitation to comply with Berry. The remaining sections of the
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Act—including section 78-15-6(3)—were still not severable, and therefore, again became
operative, which explains why section 78-15-6(3) has been in the Utah Code ever since.
To conclude otherwise leads to absurd results. If the provisions surrounding the
unconstitutional section 78-15-3 were not "reenacted" when section 78-15-3 was
amended, then there would be no surrounding statutory provisions to which the amended
section 78-15-3 statute of limitations would apply. It is difficult to imagine that the
legislature would have enacted a statute of limitation to replace the unconstitutional
statute of repose if the new provision applied to nothing. Moreover, the legislature,
courts, and citizens have recognized the provisions in the UPLA at Utah law for twenty
years. This court should not undermine the predictability and uniformity in the law by
holding that the UPLA was not technically reenacted as the Egberts would have
preferred. As a matter of public policy, the UPLA should remain operative.
As to the second certified issue—who has the burden of proof on the question of
whether the Egberts' injuries were enhanced by the alleged defect—the Egberts seek to
shift their causation burden to Nissan and to avoid having any fault apportioned to Jerad
Egbert for his (admittedly) having caused the accident. To accept this approach would
mean that Nissan, whose product played no role in causing the initial accident, would be
held jointly and severally liable for the entire extent of the Egberts' harm. The better and
more straightforward approach follows traditional tort causation law well-established in
Utah by requiring a plaintiff to prove the extent of the enhanced injuries attributable to
the defective design. This is particularly true under the specific facts of this case where
the active tortfeasor is a plaintiff, the additional plaintiffs are part of the same economic
unit, and the active tortfeasor therefore has an incentive to claim that it is unclear which

7

damages are in fact "enhanced" by an alleged product defect. In addition, the approach
comports with the abolition of joint and several liability by Utah's Liability Reform Act.
Accordingly, the court should decline to adopt Restatement (Third) of Torts section 16
(b)-(d).
ARGUMENT
I.

UTAH CODE SECTION 78-15-6(3) IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A.

The Egberts Have Not Addressed the Question of Whether Section 7815-6(3) Is Unconstitutional

The Egberts do not address the first question certified by the district court:
whether section 78-15-6(3) is unconstitutional. Instead, the Egberts address the question
of whether section 78-15-6(3) was properly re-enacted by the legislature after this court
declared it was not severable from 78-15-3, an unconstitutional statute of repose. Berry
v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 717 P.2d 670, 681-85 (Utah 1985). Importantly, Berry
did not hold that section 78-15-6(3) was unconstitutional. And this court should not hold
that section 78-15-6(3) is unconstitutional now, as the Egberts provide no basis for this
court to do so. Therefore, the straightforward answer to the question actually certified—
whether section 78-15-6(3) is unconstitutional—is "no."
Even if the court addresses the distinct question discussed by the Egberts—
whether the legislature "re-enacted" section 78-15-6(3)—the answer does not change.
When the court invalidates a non-severable statutory scheme on the ground that one
section of the scheme is unconstitutional, the legislature can "re-enact" the entire
statutory scheme merely by fixing the constitutional defect. If a statutory scheme is nonseverable for purposes of judicial review, then it should be non-severable for purposes of

8

re-enactment. This is especially true here, where there is no dispute that for nearly two
decades the legislature has intended, courts have considered, and citizens have relied
upon, the statutory scheme containing section 78-15-6(3) to have been "re-enacted."
B.

Section 78-15-6(3) Became Valid When the Legislature Fixed the
Constitutional Defect in Section 78-15-3

The Egberts argue that the legislature did not specifically re-enact section 78-156(3) after Berry; and therefore, it remains invalid. The flaw in this argument is its
exclusive focus on legislative power and whether after Berry the legislature followed the
procedure for enacting entirely new statute. The issue, however, is not whether the
legislature enacted section 78-15-6(3) after Berry, but whether the legislature fixed the
problem identified in Berry such that the entire statutory scheme, including section 7815-6(3), again became valid. This issue involves the scope and exercise of both judicial
and legislative power, i.e., the status of non-severable aspects of a statutory scheme in
which one section is declared unconstitutional by the judiciary and how a legislature can
fix the constitutional defect identified by the judiciary.
To understand why both judicial and legislative powers are at issue, it is important
to understand what is not in dispute. First, if section 78-15-6(3) had never been enacted
by the legislature, then it would not be valid.

The bulk of the Egberts' argument

concerning legislative power supports this obvious point. (AOB at 10-11.) Second,
when the legislature enacted section 78-15-6(3) in 1977, it became valid. Third, in 1985
Berry declared section 78-15-3 unconstitutional and section 78-15-6(3) non-severable
from 78-15-3, rendering both sections invalid. And, therefore, had the legislature done
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nothing in response to Berry, both section 78-15-3 and section 78-15-6(3) would have
remained invalid.
While none of these points are in dispute, they also -have nothing to do with the
issue before the court. The issue presented here is whether what the legislature, in fact,
did in response to Berry was sufficient to make section 78-15-6(3) again valid. To
determine whether the legislature's response was adequate, however, first requires this
court to determine the status of those sections of a statutory scheme declared invalid, not
because they are themselves unconstitutional, but because thev are not severable from a
section that is unconstitutional. More specifically, this court must initially determine the
effect of the court's holding in Berry—(i) whether Berry required the legislature to reenact the entire statutory scheme just as it had enacted the statutory scheme in the first
instance, or (ii) whether Berry required the legislature only to fix the specific
constitutional defect identified in Berry for the entire statutory scheme again to become
valid. This threshold question involves the effect of the exercise of judicial authority, not
merely the constitutional scope of legislative power.
Nissan contends that this court should expressly declare what it has implied for
nearly two decades: when Utah appellate courts declare invalid a non-severable statutory
scheme, properly enacted in the first instance., because one section of the statutory
scheme is unconstitutional, the legislature can make the entire statutory scheme again
valid by amending and re-enacting the section that contained the constitutional defect.
This approach not only affords appropriate deference to the legislature and the statutory
scheme it originally enacted, but it also is the approach both the legislature and courts
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have assumed reflects Utah law. This approach is sensible, and there is no reason to chart
a new course now.
1.

For Two Decades, the Legislature Has Assumed That By Fixing the
Constitutional Defect in a Statutory Scheme, the Entire Statutory
Scheme Becomes Valid

The Egberts argue the deference to the legislature requires this court to declare
unconstitutional a statutory scheme the legislature has considered valid for 20 years. The
Egberts' appeal to deference makes no sense.

Deference suggests that when the

legislature properly enacts a non-severable statutory scheme, and the courts declare the
substance of one section unconstitutional, the legislature may, as it did here, merely fix
the constitutional defect to make the properly enacted statutory scheme again valid.
Deference also suggests that this court expressly declare that this is Utah law because the
legislature has assumed that this approach reflects Utah law for two decades. Deference,
therefore, suggests exactly the opposite of what the Egberts ask this court to do.
The best indication that the legislature believes that Utah law required them only
to fix the specific constitutional defect identified in Berry is that the legislature has
assumed that the UPLA, including section 78-15-6(3), has been part of the Utah Code for
the last 20 years. Most recently, in February of 2008, when section 78 of the Utah Code
was recodified, and revised, the UPLA was renumbered, along with the other provisions
in section 78, and approved and codified by the legislature.
And the fact that the UPLA has remained in the Code for two decades is not an
oversight. In 1989, after the legislature amended the UPLA by replacing the statute of

3

The 2008 amendment, effective February 7, 2008, renumbered section 78-15-1 to -6 to
section 78B-6-701 to -707 and made some stylistic changes to the Act.
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repose declared unconstitutional with a statute of limitation consistent with the court's
concern in Berry, the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel4 determined
that the UPLA should appear in the Code because the legislature had fixed the problem
identified in Berry.5

(Senate Bill 25, attached at Addendum C.)6

This position is

consistent with the fact that section 78-15-3 was not severable from section 78-15-6(3).
"Severability, where part of an act is unconstitutional, is primarily a matter of legislative
intent." Id. (quoting Salt Lake City v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Utah, 563 P.2d

There is an established legislative process by which laws that are enacted become part
of the Utah Code. Utah Code section 36-12-12 provides that the Office of Legislative
Research and General Counsel, an arm of the legislature, is responsible for seeing that
enacted laws are incorporated into the Utah Code. Under section 36-12-(2)(g), the Office
of Legislative Research and General Counsel is tasked with reviewing, examining,
correcting, and approving the legislation and preparing the laws for publication. Section
36-12-(2)(i) provides that the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel "is to
formulate recommendations for clarification, classification, arrangement, codification,
annotation and indexing of Utah statutes . . . ." Section 36-12-(3)(g) makes clear that the
Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel is responsible for "merging any
amendments, enactments or repealers to the same code provisions that are passed by the
legislature."
5
Rules of statutory construction also underscore the frailty of the Egberts' "resurrection
theory." Utah Code section 68-3-6 provides: "The provisions of any statute, so far as
they are the same as those of any prior statute, shall be construed as a continuation of
such provisions, and not as a new enactment." This section is based on section 14 of the
Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act, which provides that a statute which is
revised, whether by amendment or by repeal and reenactment, is a continuation of the
previous statute and not a new enactment to the extent that it contains substantially the
same language as the previous statute. U.S.R.C.A. § 14. Only the new provisions are to
be considered as having been enacted at the time of the amendment. The provisions
introduced by an amendatory act should be read together with the provisions of the
original section that are reenacted or left unchanged, as if they had been originally
enacted as one section. Accordingly, the prior sections of the UPLA that were not
amended are deemed to be a continuation of the statute. These provisions remain in the
Code, not by re-enactment or implication, but by continuation. Attorney General v.
Pomeroy, 73 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1937) (reenactment of statute of limitations by 1933
revision amounted not to a repeal of the antecedent sections, but to a reaffirmation
thereof).
6
Notably, Senate Bill 25 as introduced or enacted did not alter section 6.
12

786, 791 (Utah 1977)). If the legislature intended the entire statute to operate together at
the time of Berry, then it makes sense that the legislature considered the entire statute
again valid once the specific constitutional defect in section 78-15-3 was fixed.
Moreover, as this court has recognized many times, "the best evidence of
legislative intent is the plain language of the statute." Davis v. Provo City Corp., 2008
UT 59, fl3, 193 P.3d 86, 89 (Utah 2008); Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler
Mfg. Co., 1999 UT 18, TJ30, 974 P.3d 1194, 1203 (Utah 1999). Tellingly, the reenacted
version of section 78-15-3 references the rest of the Act: "A civil action under this
chapter shall be brought within two years from the time the individual who would be the
claimant in such action discovered, or in the exercise of due diligence should have
discovered, both the harm and its cause." Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3 (emphasis added).
It is apparent from the emphasized language that the Utah legislature intended that the
remaining portions of the Act would become operative with section 78-15-3's elimination
of the constitutional problem identified in Berry.
The Egberts therefore cannot seriously dispute that the legislature believes Utah
law is that once a court declares invalid a non-severable statutory scheme on the ground
that one provision of that statutory scheme is unconstitutional, the legislature need only
fix the constitutional defect to make the entire statutory scheme operative. Deference to
the legislature suggests that this court declare expressly that this is, in fact, Utah law.
2.

For Two Decades, Courts Have Followed the Rule That By Fixing the
Constitutional Defect in a Statutory Scheme, the Entire Statutory
Scheme Becomes Valid

The legislature's belief that it only had to fix the constitutional defect in section
78-15-3 to make the entire UPLA, including section 78-15-6(3), valid is reasonable in
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light of the fact that Utah courts have implicitly followed this rule in a number of cases.
To date, nine Utah appellate decisions, including four decisions of this court, as well as
two decisions of the Tenth Circuit, have applied the very statutory provisions that the
Egberts contend has been invalid since 1985.7 In addition, the United States District
Court for the District of Utah has routinely applied the statutory provisions as well,8 and
has expressly held that section 78-15-6(3) is operative and constitutional.9
As this court observed in Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., "[although section 78-1.56(3) was neither repealed, amended, nor specifically reenacted, there is no indication that
the legislature has changed its policy regarding deference to governmental standards."
813 P.2d 89, 97 (Utah 1999). Grundberg held that a manufacturer of FDA-approved
drugs is immune from strict liability claims based on design defect in light of the
importance the legislature has placed on "governmental standards in Utah Code Ann.
Section 78-15-6(3)." 813 P.2d at 97. As this court observed, "[i]n that section, the

7

Egbert v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2007 UT 64, 167 P.3d 1058 (Utah 2007); Slisze v.
Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317, 319-20 (Utah 1999); Nay v. Gen. Motors Corp., 850 P.2d
1260, 1263 (Utah 1993); Grundberg v. Upjohn, 813 P.2d 89, 97-98 (Utah 1991); Dimick
v. OHC Liquidation Trust, 157 P.3d 347, 349-51 (Utah Ct. App. 2007); House v. Armor
of Am., 886 P.2d 542, 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., &
The Bicycle Ctr., 876 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Maack v. Resource Design &
Constr., 875 P.2d 570, 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 854
P.2d 1025, 1027-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Taylor v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 130 F.3d
1295 (10th Cir. 1997); Brown v. Sears & Roebuck Co., 328 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2003).
8
See, e.g., Ontiveors v. Danek Med., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18873 (D. Utah August 3,
1999); Salt Lake City Corp., v. Kasler Corp., 855 F. Supp. 1560, 1571 (D. Utah 1994);
Ghionis v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 839 F. Supp. 789, 794-95 (D. Utah 1993); Allen v.
Minnstar, 1989 U.S. Lexis 18395, *5-8 (D. Utah December 20, 1989).
9
Henrie Northrup Grumman Corp., 2006 WL 1129399, *4 (D. Utah April 4, 2006)
(analyzing Utah law on the constitutionality of section 78-15-6(3) and holding that,
although the Utah Supreme Court had not specifically rule on the issue, applicable case
law from this court indicated that the statute was constitutional).
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legislature declared that there is a rebuttable presumption that a product which fully
complies with the applicable government standards at the time of marketing is not
defective. Id. Grundberg, therefore, demonstrates that this sourt has already recognized
the legislature's intent that section 78-15-6(3) became operative in 1989.
Furthermore, Egbert I confirms that the legislature's reenactment of section 78-153 "addressed our constitutional concerns with the original section," citing Grundberg and
Slisze as instances in which the court has sua sponte addressed this provision. Egbert v.
Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2007 UT 64, ^J8 n.3, 167 P.3d 1058. The court also held that the
jury in this case should be instructed on Utah Code section 78-15-6(3)'s rebuttable
presumption: "[T]he jury should be informed of the presumption of nondefectiveness
under Utah Code section 78-15-6(3)." Id. The court went on to explain its analysis: "It
is common to instruct juries as to the law, and as to presumptions specifically.
Presumptions generally must be incorporated into the fact finding process for juries to
appropriately discharge their obligations as fact finders. The Egberts do not cite a good
reason, and we cannot conceive of one, not to instruct the jury here that the rebuttable
presumption of nondefectiveness applies to Nissan." Id. at 1061 (emphasis added). This
analysis presupposes that section 78-15-6(3) is valid.
For all of the reasons set forth above, the court should make express what has been
implied in its rulings for decades: section 78-15-6(3) became valid when the legislature
amended and re-enacted section 78-15-3 to remove the constitutional defect identified in
Berry.
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II.

PLAINTIFFS SHOULD HAVE THE BURDEN OF PROVING ALL
ELEMENTS OF THEIR CASE, INCLUDING ENHANCED INJURY, AND
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT APPLY RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS SECTION 16 (b)-(d)
There is great debate across the country on the question of where the burden of

proof should rest in enhanced injury cases. There are two distinct lines of authority, one
known as "Huddell/Caiazzo" and the other, "Fox/Mitchell." The Fox/Mitchell approach
follows Restatement (Third) Section 16(b)-(d) and places the burden of proof on the
question of enhanced injury on the defendant. In contrast, the Huddell/Caiazzo approach
places the burden of proof of enhanced injury on the plaintiff. Nissan contends that this
court should follow Huddell/Caiazzo, which is consistent with Utah law and wellestablished tort law principles. This is particularly true under the specific facts of this
case where the active tortfeasor is a plaintiff and the additional plaintiffs are part of the
same economic unit, giving the active tortfeasor an incentive to claim that it is unclear
which damages are in fact "enhanced" by an alleged product defect.

Adopting

Fox/Mitchell would be inconsistent with Utah law and irreconcilable with the Utah
Liability Reform Act. Accordingly, the court should apply Huddell/Caiazzo and require
the Egberts to prove all aspects of their enhanced injury claim, including the extent to
which the injuries were purportedly enhanced by the alleged defect.
A.

The "Enhanced Injury" or "Crashworthiness" Doctrine
In a crashworthiness or enhanced injury case, the plaintiff does not claim that a

defect in a vehicle caused a collision, but instead claims that a defect in the vehicle
caused injuries over and above those which would have been expected in the collision
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absent the defect.

The claim, in essence, is that the design of the vehicle failed

reasonably to protect the occupant in a collision caused by someone else.
The seminal case recognizing the enhanced injury doctrine is Larsen v. General
Motors Corporation, 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). In Larsen, the Eighth Circuit held that
the manufacturer had a duty to design the vehicle to avoid subjecting its users to an
unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision. Id. at 502. Larsen did not hold that
manufacturers are under a duty to design "accident-proof or fool-proof vehicles, nor did
it hold that manufacturers are "insurers" of their products.
overwhelming

majority

of jurisdictions

now

follow

Id. at 502-03.

Larsen's

The

reasoning—that

manufacturers must design cars so that they are reasonably crashworthy.

Berry

Levenstam & Daryl J. Lapp, Plaintiffs Burden of Proving Enhanced Injury in
Crashworthiness Cases: A Clash Worthy of Analysis, 38 De Paul L. Rev. 55, 61 n.33
(1989). In states that have adopted the crashworthiness doctrine, it is adopted as a subset
of the strict liability doctrine of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402 A, which
imposes on a plaintiff "more rigorous proof requirements than a typical section 402A
action." Barris v. Bob's Drag Chutes & Equip., Inc., 685 F.2d 94, 99 (3d Cir. 1982).
Here, the Egberts are claiming that, although a defect in the vehicle did not cause
the crash, Emily Egbert's injuries, and therefore Janessa's as well, were enhanced when
the subject Altima's allegedly defective side window glass broke out during the rollover,

Enhanced injury claims are also referred to as "second collision" or "crashworthiness"
claims. Jackson v. Warrum, 535 N.E.2d 1207, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). In the second
collision context, the "first collision" is the vehicle's collision with another object, and
the "second collision" is the occupant's contact with interior structures or components of
the vehicle, or exterior elements in the event of an ejection. Wemyss v. Coleman, Ky ,
729 S.W.2d 174, 179 (Ky. 1987).
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allowing Emily to be ejected and injured.

They correspondingly claim that, had the

window been equipped with laminated glass, she would not have been ejected and, even
though unrestrained, would have received less severe injuries because she would have
remained within the vehicle during the entire crash.
The question raised here is the following: which party bears the burden of proving
what would have happened had Emily Egbert remained in the vehicle and unbelted
through the entire accident sequence? This is really the crux of the Egberts', and any
other, enhanced injury case—the claim that there would have been little or no injury
absent the defect in design, and therefore, the defect made the injuries worse than they
would have been otherwise. Yet although the Egberts do not dispute that they have to
prove that the side window glass was defective and that their laminated glass alternative
design was feasible, they contend that Nissan should have the burden of proving the
degree to which the Egberts' injuries were enhanced. In other words, the Egberts seek to
shift the critical component of causation onto the defendant.
B.

The Two Approaches to Proving Enhanced Injury
Although the enhanced injury liability theory is well-established, controversy has

arisen over the way in which a plaintiffs burden of proof of causation can be met. One
group of cases, known as the "Huddell/Caiazzo" approach, requires a plaintiff to prove
not only the injuries attributable to the accident, but also those attributable to the design
defect. This approach is based upon Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976)
(applying New Jersey law) and Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir.
1981) (applying New York law).
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The Huddle/Caiazzo approach simply follows general tort principles by requiring
a plaintiff to bear the burden of proving all aspects of an enhanced injury claim, including
the injuries that were enhanced by the alleged defect, i.e., the injuries actually caused by
the defendant. In Huddell, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to satisfy her
burden of proving enhanced injury.

In so doing, the Third Circuit formulated the

following standard: "First, in establishing that the design in question was defective, the
plaintiff must offer proof of an alternative, safer design, practicable under the
circumstances. . . . Second, the plaintiff must offer proof of what injuries, if any, would
have resulted had the alternative, safer design been used. . . . Third, . . . the plaintiff must
offer some method of establishing the extent of enhanced injuries attributable to the
defective design." Id. at 737-38 (emphasis added). The Second Circuit reached the same
conclusion in Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., holding "the plaintiff should be required
to prove the extent of the enhanced injuries attributable to the defective design", and that
such proof requires a showing of the actual nature and the extent of the enhanced injury.
647 F.2d 241, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1981).
The Huddell/Caiazzo approach has been 'adopted in numerous jurisdictions,11
including the United States District Court for the District of Utah. In Allen v. Minnstar,
11

Toyota Motor Corp. v. Gregory, 136 S.W.3d 35 (Ky. 2004); Sumner v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 538 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) rev'd on other grounds by Lopez v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 538 N.W.2d 861 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494
N.W.2d 224 (Iowa 1992); Duran v. Gen. Motors. Corp., 688 P.2d 779 (N.M. Ct. App.
1983) rev'd on other grounds by Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54 (N.M.
1995); Garcia v. Rivera, 160 A.D.2d 274 (N.Y. App. Div. 199); Masterman v. Veldman's
Equipment, Inc., 530 N.E.2d 312, 318 (Ind. App. Ct. 1988) (there is a split of opinion in
Indiana appellate courts, see Jackson v. Warrum, 535 N.E.2d 1207, 1216 (Ind. App. Ct.
1989) (adopting Fox/Mitchell)); Mazda Motor Corp. v. Lindahl, 706 A.2d 526, 532 (Del.
Supr. Ct. 1998); Armstrong v. Lorino, 580 So.2d 528, 530 (La. App. Ct. 1991); D'Amario
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the court cited Huddell and declared: "To make out a prima facie case for enhanced
injury, a plaintiff must show the existence of an alternative, safer design, practicable
under the circumstances, and what injuries would have resulted had the safer design been
utilized." 1989 WL 434765, *1 (D. Utah Nov. 21, 1989) (emphasis added), attached as
Addendum D.

The Huddell/Caiazzo approach also has been widely praised by courts

and commentators as consistent with both the theoretical underpinnings of Larsen and
with broader themes of product liability law.

In sum, the Huddell/Caiazzo approach

properly recognizes that a plaintiff asserting an enhanced injury claim must prove all
aspects of the claim, including causation, by proving the extent of the injuries enhanced
by the alleged product defect.
The alternative approach is known as cTox/Mitchell." This approach is based
upon Fox v. Ford Motor Co.; 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978) (applying Wyoming law),
and Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, AG, 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying
Minnesota law), and later espoused by the Restatement (Third) of Torts, section 16 (c).
The Fox/Mitchell approach significantly relaxes the plaintiffs burden of proof of

v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So.2d 424, 437 (Fla. 2001). See also Caiazzo v. Volswagenwerk
A.G., 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981).
Although the Court determined that Allen was not an enhanced injury case, it
specifically indicated that the heightened burden provided by Huddell would apply to
such a case. Allen, 1989 WL 434765 at *1 ("Apparently Allen resists this
characterization because of the evidentiary showing necessary to allow his claim to
proceed to trial.").
3
Heather Fox Vickies and Michael E. Oldham, Enhanced Injury Should Not Equal
Enhanced Liability, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 417 (1995), attached as Addendum E; see also
Louis R. Frumer & Melvin L. Friedman, Products Liability 21.04[1], at 21-26 (1991)
(stating that the Huddell approach clearly represents "the current and better view" and is
eminently fair to all litigants in that it places the burden of proof where it properly
belongs, on the plaintiff, to prove with particularity the injuries that have been enhanced).
20

proximate cause, shifts the critical part of that burden to the defendant, and embraces
joint and several liability.
Under the Fox/Mitchell approach, a plaintiff must demonstrate only that the
alleged defect was a substantial factor in causing some injuries to a plaintiff, at which
point the causation burden shifts to the manufacturer to prove which injuries resulted
from the initial accident and which injuries resulted from the vehicle's allegedly defective
design. In Fox, the court saw no difference between an enhanced injury case and one in
which a passive tortfeasor and an active tortfeasor "cooperate" to produce an injury. Fox,
575 F.2d at 787. The court further reasoned that apportionment or segregation of injuries
is neither appropriate nor possible where an injury is "indivisible," such as death or
paralysis, and in that case, a defendant will be jointly and severally liable for all injuries.
Id. Thus, if such injuries cannot be segregated, the manufacturer—whose product played
no role in the initial accident—is held jointly and severally liable for the entire extent of
the plaintiffs damages.
Although some courts have adopted the Fox/Mitchell approach,14 critics assert,
and Nissan agrees, that this approach erodes the principles upon which Larsen and the
14

Gen. Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So.2d 1176, 1189-90 (Ala. 1985) overruled on
other grounds by Schwartz v. Volvo N. Am. Corp., 554 So.2d 927 (Ala. 1989); Oakes v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 628 N.E.2d 341, 349 (111. App. Ct. 1993); Valk Mfg. Co. v.
Rangaswamv, 537 A.2d 622, 633 (Md. Ct. Spec. App., 1988) rev'd on other grounds
Montgomery County v. Valk. Mfg. Co., 562 A.2d 1246 (Md. 1989); Lally v. Volkswagen
Aktiengesellschaft, 698 N.E.2d 28, 39 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998); McDowell v. Kawasaki
Motors Corp. USA, 799 S.W.2d 854, 867 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Kudlacek v. Fiat S.pA,
509 N.W.2d 603, 611-12 (Neb. 1994); Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 761 A.2d 477,
482-83 (N.H. 2000); Harsh v. Petroll, 887 A.2d 209, 217-19 (Pa. 2005); Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Castaneda, 980 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App. 1998); Blankenship v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781, 786 (W. Va. 1991); Maskrey v. Volkwagenwerk A.G., 370
N.W.2d 815, 821 (Wise. Ct. App. 1985); Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123,
1130(Wyo. 1978).
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enhanced injury doctrine are grounded and unfairly extends manufacturers' potential
liability far beyond the actual enhanced injuries to all injury sustained in an accident
which the manufacturer played no part in causing.15
C.

The Huddell/Caiazzo Approach is Consistent with Utah Law and Should be
Adopted.
Federal courts analyzing the burden of proof in an enhanced injury case must look

to the substantive law of the forum state. Wankier v. Crown Equip. Co., 353 F.3d 862,
866 (10th Cir. 2003). Not surprisingly, the Tenth Circuit has reached different results as
to what burden to apply in an enhanced injury case depending on the underlying state
law. Compare Allen v. Minnstar, 1989 WL 434765 (D. Utah Nov. 21, 1989) (Utah), with
Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 890 F.2d 1540 (10th Cir. 1990) (New Mexico) (both
finding that a plaintiff bears the burden of proving enhanced injury) and Fox v. Ford
Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978) (Wyoming) (shifting the causation burden to
defendant); and! Harvey, 873 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1989) (also applying Wyoming law,
but moving away from the Fox/Mitchell approach and toward Huddell/Caiazzo). Since
this court has only just recognized the enhanced injury doctrine, this court necessarily
must look not only to existing Utah law, but also to pertinent authority from other sources
for guidance. The Fox/Mitchell approach is in tension with existing Utah tort law and
directly conflicts with the Utah Liability Reform Act's prohibition on joint and several
liability. In contrast, the Huddell/Caiazzo approach accurately reflects the jurisprudence

15

2A Louis R. Frumer & Melvin L. Friedman, Products Liability 21.04[4], at 21-35;
Heather Fox Vickies and Michael E. Oldham, Enhanced Injury Should Not Equal
Enhanced Liability, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 417 (1995).
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in Utah with respect to causation.

In addition, general tort law principles and the

direction of the states in the Tenth Circuit favor applying the Huddle/Caiazzo approach.
1.

Relaxing the Standard of Proof for Proximate Cause is Contrary to
Existing Utah Law

Under Utah law, a plaintiff bears "the ultimate burden of proving all the elements
of his cause of action," including causation. Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, 874 P.2d 120,
124 (Utah 1994); Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah Ct. App.
1994). In order to prevail on a claim of product defect, plaintiffs must show that: (1) the
product was defective at the time it was sold; (2) the product was unreasonably dangerous
at the time it was sold; and (3) the unreasonably dangerous and defective condition
caused the plaintiffs injuries. Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6 (2007).16 To meet their burden
of proof on causation, the Utah Court of Appeals has said that plaintiffs must adduce
sufficient evidence '"from which the fact finder may rationally conclude that plaintiffs']
injuries and damages proximately resulted from the product's failure of performance
causally related to its defective condition.'" Burns, 876 P.2d at 418. In other words, in
Utah a plaintiff asserting a defect in design must prove that the defect proximately caused
her injuries, and that an alternative design would have prevented them.
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Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp , 869 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 1993); Ernest W. Hahn,
Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 1979). In addition, in a design defect
case, a plaintiff must prove that a feasible alternative design would have prevented the
plaintiffs injuries. Allen v. Minnstar, 8 F.3d 1470, 1479 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Now, in
making our best effort to ascertain and apply Utah law, we conclude that the district
judge did not err in holding that the plaintiff did bear the burden of showing that an
alternative, safer design, practicable under the circumstances, was available at the time
the boat and engine were sold."); Wankier v. Crown Equip. Corp., 353 F.3d 862, 866
(10th Cir. 2003) (stating that the plaintiff, in a design defect case, "bears the burden of
showing that an alternative, safer design, practicable under the circumstances, was
available at the time the [products] were sold").
23

This causation standard should apply equally to an enhanced injury case based on
an alleged design defect. Indeed, this conclusion is supported by the only opinion of a
court in Utah 1o address the issue. As indicated above, in Allen v. Minnstar the Utah
District Court cited Huddell and declared: "To make out a prima facie case for enhanced
injury, a plaintiff must show the existence of an alternative, safer design, practicable
under the circumstances, and what injuries would have resulted had the safer design been
utilized. 1989 WL 434765, *1 (D. Utah Nov. 21, 1989) (emphasis added).
The Huddell/Caiazzo approach is fully consistent with Utah product liability law
as discussed above. Under Huddell/Caiazzo, plaintiffs must prove the causation element
of their claim by demonstrating that there is a difference between the actual injury
sustained and the injury that would have occurred under the same circumstances had the
design been different. In contrast, applying the Fox/Mitchell approach would erode the
causation standard otherwise applicable under Utah tort doctrine. Under traditional legal
principles, because the parties initiating complaints—plaintiffs—stand to benefit from the
proof, they have the burden to prove each element of their claims. W. Prosser, Law of
Torts § 38 (4th ed. 1971) ("The burden of proof. . . is quite uniformly upon the plaintiff,
since he is asking the court for relief, and must lose if his case does not outweigh that of
his adversary); Prosser & Keaton on Torts, § 41, p. 269 (5th ed. 1984).
The Fox/Mitchell approach, however, allows a plaintiff to prevail despite
inadequate and speculative proof of proximate cause. This court has held that when
proof is "so tenuous, vague, or insufficiently established that determining causation
becomes 'completely speculative,5 the claim fails as a matter of law.'"' Harline v. Barker,
912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). In practice, the Fox/Mitchell approach
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does not meet this threshold because it permits speculative proof of causation.
Specifically, the "substantial factor" approach adopted by the Fox/Mitchell approach
does not require proof of what a plaintiffs injuries would have been absent the alleged
defect. Without such proof, no basis exists for determining that there is, in fact, an
enhanced injury. In effect, the substantial factor approach relieves the plaintiff of the
burden of proving a causal relationship between the defect and the injury being claimed.
The result is that under Fox/Mitchell, a plaintiff can hold the manufacturer liable—jointly
and severally liable—despite the fact that she cannot demonstrate that her injuries were
actually enhanced due to the alleged defect.

This is "directly at odds with the

fundamental doctrine of enhanced injury liability." Levenstam & Lapp, 38 De Paul L.
Rev. 55, 76.
Put another way, limited enhanced-injury liability should not be converted into
"plenary liability for the entire consequence of an accident which the automobile
manufacturer played no part in precipitating." Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 739 (3d
Cir. 1976). By effectively removing the element of causation from a plaintiffs case, the
"substantial factor" approach leads to the imposition of absolute, rather than strict,
liability, contrary to both the established tenets of strict liability and Utah law. Indeed,
"[fjrom its inception . . . strict liability has never been, and is not now, absolute liability.
As has been repeatedly expressed, under strict liability, the manufacturer does not thereby
become an insurer" of its product. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d
152, 157 (Utah 1979) (quoting Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1165-1166
(Cal. 1978)). This principle unquestionably applies in an enhanced injury case. Larsen,
391 F.2d at 502-03. Under Huddell/Caiazzo, this problem is avoided by requiring
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plaintiffs to satisfy their ordinary burden on causation by providing specific proof of
injury enhancement.
Despite the Egberts' argument to the contrary, this court in Tingey v. Christensen,
987 P.2d 588, 592 (Utah 1999), has not endorsed the Fox/Mitchell approach by adopting
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 433(a) and (b) in the pre-existing injury context.
(AOB at 13-14.) In Tingey, the plaintiff suffered from a host of physical problems that
were allegedly exacerbated by a car accident. IcL at 591. At trial, her witnesses claimed
it was impossible to apportion her pain and suffering between her pre-existing conditions
and the injuries suffered in the car accident. Id

The court agreed that a jury instruction

should have been given informing that jury that if it "can find a reasonable basis for
apportioning damages between a pre-existing condition and a subsequent tort, it should
do so; however if the jury finds it impossible to apportion damages, it should find that
tortfeasor is liable for the entire amount of damages." Id. at 592. The Egberts argue that
this holding is consistent with the adoption of Fox -Mitchell in an enhanced injury case.
This argument fails for at least two reasons. First, Tingey involved a so-called
"egg-shell plaintiff," and therefore implicates the unrelated policy that a defendant should
not benefit by injuring a person with pre-existing medical conditions rather than a healthy
person.

Unlike an "egg-shell plaintiff," the Egberts are not entitled to all damages

suffered from all causes. Instead, the entire basis of their claim is that Nissan is liable
only for the "enhanced" injuries that occurred due to Nissan's alleged failure to
manufacture a crashworthy car. (AOB at 14 (admitting that plaintiff "retains the burden
of proving defect and increased harm").) Accordingly, the very nature of the Egberts'
claim requires that they parse out the "enhanced" damages from the damages that
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ordinarily would have flowed from the accident. While an "egg-shell plaintiff," like the
plaintiff in Tingey, is entitled to all damages to the extent they cannot be apportioned,
this is not the case here.
Second, the Utah Liability Reform Act was not implicated in Tingey. Unlike
Tingey, this case does not involve a situation where there is only one person allegedly at
fault. Mr. Egbert admittedly caused the accident and bears fault for his negligent acts.
When there are multiple tortfeasors, as in this instance, the Utah Liability Reform Act
requires that the damages be apportioned among the multiple tortfeasors. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-27 ("No defendant is liable . . . for any amount in excess of the proportion
of fault attributed to that defendant"). Analogizing the damage caused by Mr. Egbert's
negligence to the "pre-existing condition" of an "egg-shell plaintiff in Tingey disregards
this state's clear requirement of fault apportionment among multiple tortfeasors and puts
Nissan on the hook for all damages regardless of who was responsible for them.
Although the Egberts' assert that Fox/Mitchell has been adopted by a "strong
majority of courts," this claim is disingenuous. Criticizing the Restatement Reporters,
legal scholars have pointed out that "recent decisions on the burden of proof issue are
almost evenly split." Vickies and Oldham, Enhanced Injury Should Not Equal Enhanced
Liability, 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 417, 447 (1995) [hereinafter Vickies, Enhanced Injury].
Indeed, these scholars insist that no "majority" position has yet emerged; and in fact,
most states have not yet directly addressed this issue." Id. To date, only twenty states
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have adopted Fox/Mitchell17 while the other 30 states have either adopted Huddell18 or
have not yet decided which of the two approaches they will follow.19 The majority of
states that have adopted the Fox/Mitchell approach retain some form of joint and several
liability. Thus, contrary to the Egberts' assertions, courts are deeply split on the question
of which party has the burden of proof in enhanced injury cases.
As pointed

out by Vickies and Oldham, the Restatement Reporters

"mischaracterize many states as supportive of the Fox/Mitchell approach when their case
law either clearly does not support that approach or has not yet addressed the issue."
Vickies, Enhanced Injury at 447. For example, the Reporters include New Jersey and
Indiana as states supporting Fox/Mitchell despite the fact that most courts in New Jersey

17

See supra, note 14.
D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So.2d 424, 437-439 (Fla. 2001); Reed v. Chrysler
Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224 (Iowa 1992); Toyota Motor Corp. v. Gregory, 136 S.W.3d 35
(Ky. 2004); Sumner v. Gen. Motors Corp., 538 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) rev'd
on other grounds by Lopez v. Gen. Motors Corp., 569 N.W.2d 861 (Mich. Ct. App.
1997); Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 591 A.2d 966 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991); See also Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir.1976); See also Mclaughlin v.
Nissan Motors Corp., 655 A.2d 107 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994) Thornton v. General
Motors Corp., 655 A.2d 107 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994); Duran v. General Motors
Corp., 688 P.2d 779 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) rev'd on other grounds by Brooks v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54 (N.M. 1995); Garcia v. Rivera, 160 A.D.2d 274, (N.Y. App.
Div. 1990); Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981).
19
These states are Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and
Washington.
18
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that have considered the issue have adopted Huddell/Caiazzo,

and a clear split of

authority exists in Indiana.
Furthermore, the Reporters include Florida as a state that has or will adopt
Fox/Mitchell.

However, this conclusion is contrary to recent case law and the

conclusions of legal scholars and practitioners in Florida. See D'Amario v. Ford Motor
Co, 806 So.2d 424, 437-39 (Fla. 2001) (placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove the
defect, the defect's causal relationship to the injuries and the "existence of additional or
enhanced injuries caused by the defect."); and Larry Roth, The Burden of Proof
Conundrum in Motor Vehicle Crashworthiness Cases, 80 Fla. Bar J. 10, 16-18 (Feb.
2006) (asserting the Florida Supreme Court must adopted the Huddell/Caiazzo approach
following its decision in D'Amario).
Colorado is also cited by the Reporters as a state that would adopt Fox/Mitchell
based on case law from the 1980s.

The Reporters do not mention, however, that

Colorado has since statutorily abolished joint and several liability. See Colo. Rev. Stat.
13-21-406, 13-21-111.5 (2006). The Reporters also fail to acknowledge federal appellate
court precedent imposing the burden of proving the extent of enhancement upon plaintiff
under Colorado law. Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 808, 813 (10th Cir. 1981).

20

Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 591 A.2d 966 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991);
Mclaughlin v. Nissan Motors Corp., 655 A.2d 107 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994); but
see Thornton v. General Motors Corp.. 655 A.2d 107 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994)
(disagreeing with McLaughlin and applying Fox-Mitchell).
21

Jackson v. Warrum, 535 N.E.2d 1207 (Ind. Ct. App. 1st dist. 1989) (adopting FoxMitchell); vs. Masterman v. Veldman's Equip., Inc., 530 N.E.2d 312 (Ind. Ct. App. 3rd
Dist. 1988) (adopting HuddelD.
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That the Reporters repeatedly cite questionable and irrelevant state precedent to
predict that jurisdictions will adopt the Fox/Mitchell approach entirely undermines the
Restatements adoption of the Fox/Mitchell approach.
The Tenth Circuit's recent interpretation of the law of surrounding states also
endorses the Huddell/Caiazzo approach.

As explained more fully below, this is in

keeping with the trend in the various states toward abolishing joint and several liability in
favor of pure comparative fault. In interpreting New Mexico law, which like Utah has
abolished joint and several liability, the Tenth Circuit cited Huddell and found that New
Mexico law requires a plaintiff to "offer some method of establishing the extent of
enhanced injuries attributable to the defective design." Cleveland, 890 F.2d at 1546
(citing Duran v. Gen. Motors Corp., 688 P.2d 779, 787 (N.M. 1983) and Huddell 537
F.2dat738.).
Likewise, applying Wyoming law, the Tenth Circuit has now determined that
Wyoming does not follow the Fox/Mitchell approach. In Harvey v. General Motors
Corporation, seeking to clarify its previous holding under Wyoming law in Fox, the
Tenth Circuit substantially modified its prior decision. 873 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1989)
(applying Wyoming law). Responding to criticism of the Fox decision, the court held:
"In our view, Fox does not tell us that a finding of causation necessitates an award of
damages. Rather, Fox permits apportionment of damages if there are distinct harms or
there is a reasonable basis for determining the causes of injury."

Id. at 1349.

Consequently, Harvey held it is not enough to prove that a defect was a substantial factor
in producing an injury. A plaintiff must prove that a defect caused injury "over and
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above" the injury that "probably would have occurred" absent the alleged defect. Id. at
1348-49. In sum, Harvey requires the plaintiff to prove the injuries he would have
suffered but for the injury enhancing defect, moving the Tenth Circuit states (particularly
Wyoming) closer to Huddell than Fox. Id.; Louis R. Frumer & Melvin L. Friedman,
Products Liability § 21,04[3], at 21-44 n. 66.
This court should likewise follow well-established principles of Utah law on the
proof of causation. The court should find that the Egberts must prove all aspects of their
product defect claim, including causation of their enhanced injuries.
2.

Utah's Liability Reform Act Abolished Joint and Several Liability

Despite the fact that Utah statutorily abolished joint and several liability thirty
years ago, the Egberts ask the court to adopt an approach to the enhanced injury doctrine
that is based on joint and several liability.
Utah enacted the Utah Liability Reform Act ("ULRA") in 1986. It abolished joint
and several liability and adopted a comparative fault scheme, requiring the fault of
plaintiffs and defendants to be compared by the jury and apportioned accordingly. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-38(3) (2007). The ULRA provides that u[n]o defendant is liable to
any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed
to that defendant under Section 78-27-39." IdL at § 78-27-38(3). The statutory abolition
of joint and several liability applies to all actions based upon the broad definition of fault,
whatever the theory of liability, including strict products liability and negligence. Id. §
78-27-37(2).
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The purpose of the Act was to ensure that no defendant pay any more than its "fair
share" of damages. Minutes, Utah Senate, State and Local Standing Committee, 46th
Leg., 1986 General Sess. (Jan. 27, 1986); Floor Debate, Utah House of Representatives,
46th Leg., 1986 General Sees., Records 17 & 18 (Feb. 26, 1986). As one senator
observed, "it is the basic fairness concept we're driving at. The defendant ought to be on
the hook only for its own percentage of damages, but ought not be the guarantor for
everyone else's damages." Floor Debate, Utah Senate, 46th Leg. 1986, General Sess.,
Records No. 63 (Feb. 12, 1986) (emphasis added). It is clear from the legislative history
that the Act was aimed at, among other things, "abolishing joint and several liability." Id.
Contrary to the ULRA, the Fox/Mitchell approach imposes upon manufacturers
joint and several liability when a plaintiff cannot show what enhanced injuries were
incurred as a result of the alleged defect. Restatement (Third) of Torts, § 16(b)-(d); cmt.
e (stating if plaintiff meets the substantial factor requirement the defendant is held
"jointly and severally liable only for the increased harm" under subsection (b), and jointly
and severally liable for the entire harm under subsection (c)). Tellingly, unlike Utah, the
majority of states that have adopted the Fox/Mitchell approach also retain joint and
several liability.

Yet the Egberts argue that this court should hold that if enhanced

These states are Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Wisconsin, and West
Virginia. General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176, 1195 (Ala. 1985) (holding
that where two or more tortfeasors act to produce an indivisible injury, apportionment is
not allowed and each tortfeasor is jointly and severally liable); Oakes v. General Motors
Corp., 628 N.E.2d 341, 349 (111. App. Ct. 1993) (finding joint and several liability if
injury is indivisible and the defendant's defective product was a substantial factor in
causing the injuries); Consumer Protection Div. v. Morgan, 874 A.2d 919, 950 (Md.
2005) (stating that a single injury incapable of apportionment triggers joint and several
liability); Shantigar Found, v. Bear Mountain Builders, 804 N.E.2d 324, 332 (Mass.
2004) (stating that under Massachusetts's system of joint and several liability, a plaintiff
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injuries cannot be proved with exactness, Nissan is liable for all injuries. This position
conflicts with the Utah statute.
The cases cited by the Egberts do not address joint and several liability at all.
(AOB at 13-14.) Tingey v. Christensen is a negligence case against a single tortfeasor
stemming from a traffic accident and Renegade Oil v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. is an
insurance bad faith case. Tingey involved one tortfeasor and addressed the proper jury
instruction to be given when a plaintiffs preexisting injury is aggravated in an accident.
Tingey v. Christensen, 987 P.2d 588 (Utah 1999). Renegade Oil is even further removed,
addressing the degree to which damages must be proven in an insurance bad faith case.
Renegade Oil Inc. v. Progressive Gas Ins. Co., 101 P.2d 383 (Utah Ct. App. 2004).
Neither of these cases addresses the burden of causation applicable to a product liability

injured by more than one tortfeasor may sue any or all of them for her full damages);
McDowell v. Kawasaki Motors Corp. USA, 799 S.W.2d 854, 867 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)
(stating that where concurrent or successive negligent acts are in combination the direct
and proximate cause of a single injury and it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury, then either negligent actor is responsible for the
whole injury); Lindgren v. City of Gering, 292 N.W.2d 921 (Neb. 1980) (holding that if
two causes produce a single indivisible injury, joint and several liability attaches); N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507:7-e (1986) (joint and several liability unless fault is less than 50%
and then several liability); Am. Agency Sys., Inc. v. Marceleno, 53 P.3d 929 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2002) (finding that joint and several liability is the rule if the injured party is not
negligent, despite the existence of a contrary statutory scheme); Menarde v. Philadelphia
Transp. Co., 103 A.2d 681, 685 (Pa. 1954) (finding that "if defendant's negligence was a
substantial factor in producing the result, in contributing to the injury, defendant is liable
for the full amount of damages sustained, without any apportionment or diminution for
the other cause or causes"); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.012-013 (Vernon
1985) (joint and several liability if defendant's fault is more than 50%); Wis. Stat. §
895.045 (1995) (joint and several liability if defendant is more than 51% at fault); W. Va.
Code § 55-7-13; Bd. of Educ. of McDowell County v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc.,
390 S.E.2d 796 (W.Va. 1990) (stating that the plaintiff may elect to sue any or all of
those responsible for his injuries and collect his damages from whoever is able to pay,
whatever the percentage of fault. Furthermore, the statute's modified rule for
contributory negligence did not remove joint and several liability).
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case and neither supports the adoption of the Fox/Mitchell approach in an enhanced
injury case.
What the Egberts are asking is to shift what is properly their burden of proof on
causation to Nissan, thus depriving the jury of the ability to apportion fault to another
tortfeasor, Jerad Egbert. The result would be to make Nissan jointly and severally liable
for ah the damages attributable to the accident. This is specifically prohibited under the
ULRA. The more consistent approach is found in Cleveland, where the Tenth Circuit
determined whether fault should be apportioned between alleged tortfeasors that caused
the accident and those that were liable for crashworthiness under New Mexico's nearly
identical comparative fault scheme: "We are satisfied that the New Mexico Supreme
Court would hold that common sense in the fair application of its pure comparative
negligence system mandates that the negligence of all parties, including original
tortfeasors and crashworthiness tortfeasors, which proximately causes enhanced injuries
in a crashworthiness or "second collision" case must be compared." 890 F.2d at 1546.
In sum, under the ULRA, an enhanced injury defendant cannot be held liable,
jointly and severally or otherwise, for any harm beyond that for which it is responsible.
Because the Fox/Mitchell approach embraces joint and several liability, this approach to
the enhanced injury doctrine should be rejected by the court. The court should hold that
Plaintiffs continue to bear the burden of establishing enhanced injury and that, if that
burden can be met, fault must be apportioned to both Jerad Egbert and Nissan.
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D.

Public Policy Considerations Support the Adoption of the Huddell/Caiazzo
Approach.
1.

The Huddell/Caiazzo Approach is Consistent with the Underlying
Doctrine of Enhanced Injury Liability

Levanstam and Lapp, in their analysis of the "enhanced injury" doctrine, note that
it has two fundamental logical corollaries. First, because the allegedly defective product
did not play a role in causing the initial accident, the manufacturer should be held liable
only for injuries over and above those that would have been sustained as a result of the
initial collision.

Second, the plaintiff should bear the burden of proving causation

between the alleged defect and the enhanced injury. The Huddell/Caiazzo approach to
the element of proximate causation is "the logical extension of these two corollaries."
Levanstam and Lapp, supra at 75.
The Huddell/Caiazzo approach requires that the plaintiff prove the alleged defect
is the sole cause of the enhanced injury, and plaintiff must offer proof of what injuries
would have occurred as a result of the initial accident in the absence of the alleged defect.
The "substantial factor" approach adopted by Fox/Mitchell does not require proof of what
a plaintiffs injuries would have been absent the alleged defect. Without such proof,
however, no basis exists for determining that there is, in fact, an enhanced injury. As the
court in Larsen stated:
Any . . . defect not causing the accident would not subject the
manufacturer to liability for the entire damage, but the manufacturer
should be liable for that portion for the damage or injury caused by
the defective design over and above the damage or injury that
probably would have occurred as a result of the impact or collision
absent the defective design.
391F.2dat503.
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Under Huddell/Caiazzo, this problem is remedied by requiring specific proof of
enhancement. By definition, an enhanced injury defendant has played no part in causing
the initial accident.

Limited enhanced-injury liability should not be converted into

"plenary liability for the entire consequence of an accident which the automobile
manufacturer played no part in precipitating." Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 739 (3d
Cir. 1976).
2.

Huddell/Caiazzo is a More Fair and Workable Approach to the
Enhanced Injury Doctrine

In enhanced injury cases, it is "simpler, fairer, and conceptually more sound" to
require plaintiffs to prove the extent of the enhancement." Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk,
A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 1981). Fox/Mitchell presents numerous practical
problems.
The manufacturer, in order to defend itself, is compelled to bear the burden of
proving a negative—that the allegedly defective product did not cause plaintiffs'
enhanced injuries.

Moreover, placing the burden of disproving enhancement on the

manufacturer encourages litigation because nearly every auto accident injury could be
categorized as a "second collision" injury. Edward T. O'Donnell, Public Policy and the
Burden of Proof in Enhanced Injury Litigation: A Case Study in the Dangers of Trends
and Easy Assumptions, 17 W. St. U. L. Rev. 325 (1990). A plaintiff could argue while
the accident was the fault of the driver of their vehicle or another vehicle, their injuries
were enhanced by a vehicle component (i.e. airbag) or by the failure of the vehicle to
keep them inside. Plaintiffs would have nothing to lose in joining manufacturers as
defendants in nearly every case. Id.
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Furthermore, a straightforward application of the Fox/Mitchell approach would
result in the likelihood that accident-causing drivers will regularly be compensated by
manufacturers for harm some portion of which proximately flow from their own conduct.
This will be especially true in single-vehicle accidents, such as this one, where the
accident is admittedly the fault of Jerad Egbert. The facts of this case provide a glimpse
of the potential inequity of this approach: had Emily Egbert been wearing her seat belt,
most if not all of any "enhanced injuries" would have been eliminated.

This is

particularly true under the facts of this case where the Egberts, including tortfeasor Jerad
Egbert, are a single economic unit. Adopting Fox/Mitchell would give Jerad Egbert and
those similarly situated every incentive to avoid having to parcel out injuries, as failing to
do so would result in a windfall to him. Jerad Egbert has every incentive to sit back and
do nothing but rely on the jury feeling sympathetic to his wife and child under the
Fox/Mitchell approach, as such an approach allows him to escape his own liability. This
court should not adopt an approach that allows a plaintiff to avoid the consequences of
his or her own conduct. Utah law and sound public policy both suggest that this court
adopt the Huddell/Caiazzo approach.

13

The trial court has held that while Nissan may introduce evidence of seatbelt nonuse for
purposes of showing overall safe design of the vehicle and the accident sequence, the
Utah Seatbelt Nonuse statute prohibits Nissan from asserting Emily Egbert's seatbelt
nonuse was negligent. As Nissan is precluded from arguing that Emily Egbert's seatbelt
nonuse was the proximate cause of her ejection, it would be inherently unfair to allow
The Egberts to argue that the tempered glass window was the proximate cause of the
Egbert's enhanced injuries without having to show the enhanced injuries with
particularity.
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CONCLUSION
The court should hold that the UPLA is constitutional.

Following the 1989

enactment of the statute of limitations in section 3, the remaining portions of the UPLA
became operative again. This explains why section 78-15-6(3) has been listed in the
Utah Code for twenty years. Even during the last legislative session, when the entire
section of the code that contained the UPLA was renumbered, the UPLA remained
approved and codified by the legislature. It is not by mistake or oversight that the UPLA
has remained part of the laws of Utah for twenty years, it is because of defined legislative
process and unambiguous statutory requirements.
Predictability and uniformity of law are of param

nportance.

Because

residents, corporate citizens, and Utah courts have relied on and applied the UPLA
consistently throughout the past twenty years, rendering it unconstitutional now would be
entirely inappropriate. The UPLA is firmly consistent with the legislature's views. Thus,
as a matter of public policy, the court should find that the UPLA remains operative.
Furthermore, the Court should also adopt the Huddell/Caiazzo approach for
determining when a plaintiff can recover for "enhanced injuries." Under the alternative
Fox/Mitchell approach, a plaintiff can shift the burden of proving which injuries resulted
from the original cause of the accident and which "enhanced injuries" resulted from a
design defect. The Fox-Mitchell approach permits a defendant manufacturer to be held
jointly and severally liable for a--plaintiff s entire injury, even where no party has
established a link between any injuries and the allegedly defective product by a
preponderance of the evidence. This result is contrary to public policy and the legislative
history of the ULRA. This approach is especially harsh under the specific facts of this
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case where the plaintiff himself is the cause of the accident. Adopting Fox/Mitchell in
this case, where the active tortfeasor and additional plaintiffs are part of the same
economic unit, would incentivize plaintiffs to claim that it is" unclear which damages can
be attributed to the passive tortfeasor.
In contrast, the Huddell/Caiazzo is not only consistent with Utah law, it is the
better-reasoned approach to enhanced injury cases, particularly under the facts of this
case.

Huddell/Caiazzo appropriately requires a plaintiff to bear the burden of

establishing causation.

Enhanced injury should not equal enhanced liability for

manufacturers. Fox/Mitchell should be rejected, and the jury should be instructed that
the Egberts must specifically prove which injuries the alleged design defect caused.
DATED this 27th day of May, 2009.
Snell & Wilmer LLP

KarniFFTBrown
Troy L. Booher
Attorneys for Nissan Motor Co., Ltd.
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ADDENDUM

Tab A

78-15-6 Defect or defective condition making product unreasonably dangerous - Rebuttable
presumption.
In any action for damages for personal injury, death, or property damage allegedly caused by a defect in
a product:
(1) No product shall be considered to have a defect or to be in a defective condition, unless at the time
the product was sold by the manufacturer or other initial seller, there was a defect or defective condition
in the product which made the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.
(2) As used in this act, "unreasonably dangerous" means that the product was dangerous to an extent
beyond which would be contemplated by the ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer or user of that
product in that community considering the product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers and uses
together with any actual knowledge, training, or experience possessed by that particular buyer, user or
consumer.
(3) There is a rebuttable presumption that a product is free from any defect or defective condition where
the alleged defect in the plans or designs for the product or the methods and techniques of
manufacturing, inspecting and testing the product were in conformity with government standards
established for that industry which were in existence at the time the plans or designs for the product or
the methods and techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the product were adopted.
1977

TabB

78-27-37 Definitions.
As used in Section 78-27-37 through Section 78-27-43 :
(1) "Defendant" means a person, other than a person immune from suit as defined in Subsection (3),
who is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission proximately causing or
contributing to injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, including negligence in all its
degrees, comparative negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express or implied
warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, modification, or abuse of a product.
(3) "Person immune from suit" means:
(a) an employer immune from suit under Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers' Compensation Act, or Chapter
3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; and
(b) a governmental entity or governmental employee immune from suit pursuant to Title 63, Chapter
30d, Governmental Immunity Act of Utah.
(4) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or reimbursement on its own behalf,
or on behalf of another for whom it is authorized to act as legal representative.
2005

78-27-38 Comparative negligence.
(1) The fault of a person seeking recovery may not alone bar recovery by that person.
(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose fault,
combined with the fault of persons immune from suit and nonparties to whom fault is allocated, exceeds
the fault of the person seeking recovery prior to any reallocation of fault made under Subsection 78-2739 (2).
(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of
fault attributed to that defendant under Section 78-27-39 .
(4) (a) The fact finder may, and when requested by a party shall, allocate the percentage or proportion of
fault attributable to each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, to any person immune from suit,
and to any other person identified under Subsection 78-27-41 (4) for whom there is a factual and legal
basis to allocate fault. In the case of a motor vehicle accident involving an unidentified motor vehicle,
the existence of the vehicle shall be proven by clear and convincing evidence which may consist solely
of one person's testimony.
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune from suit is considered only to accurately determine the fault
of the person seeking recovery and a defendant and may not subject the person immune from suit to any
liability, based on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action.
2005
78-27-39 Separate special verdicts on total damages and proportion of fault.

(1) The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate
special verdicts determining the total amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of
fault attributable to each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, to any person immune from suit,
and to any other person identified under Subsection 78-27-41 (4) for whom there is a factual and legal
basis to allocate fault.
(2) (a) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault attributed to all persons immune from suit is
less than 40%, the trial court shall reduce that percentage or proportion of fault to zero and reallocate
that percentage or proportion of fault to the other parties and those identified under Subsection 78-27-41
(4) for whom there is a factual and legal basis to allocate fault in proportion to the percentage or
proportion of fault initially attributed to each by the fact finder. After this reallocation, cumulative fault
shall equal 100% with the persons immune from suit being allocated no fault.
(b) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault attributed to all persons immune from suit is 40%
or more, that percentage or proportion of fault attributed to persons immune from suit may not be
reduced under Subsection (2)(a).
(c) (i) The jury may not be advised of the effect of any reallocation under Subsection (2).
(ii) The jury may be advised that fault attributed to persons immune from suit may reduce the award of
the person seeking recovery.
(3) A person immune from suit may not be held liable, based on the allocation of fault, in this or any
other action.
2005

78-27-40 Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault - No contribution.
(1) Subject to Section 78-27-38 , the maximum amount for which a defendant may be liable to any
person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage or
proportion of fault attributed to that defendant.
(2) A defendant is not entitled to contribution from any other person.
(3) A defendant or person seeking recovery may not bring a civil action against any person immune
from suit to recover damages resulting from the allocation of fault under Section 78-27-38 .
1994
78-27-41 Joinder of defendants.
(1) A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the litigation, may join as a defendant,
in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any person other than a person immune from suit
alleged to have caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the
purpose of having determined their respective proportions of fault.
(2) A person immune from suit may not be named as a defendant, but fault may be allocated to a person
immune from suit solely for the purpose of accurately determining the fault of the person seeking
recovery and all defendants. A person immune from suit is not subject to any liability, based on the
allocation of fault, in this or any other action.

(3) (a) A person immune from suit may intervene as a party under Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, regardless of whether or not money damages are sought.
(b) A person immune from suit who intervenes in an action may not be held liable for any fault allocated
to that person under Section 78-27-38 .
(4) Fault may not be allocated to a non-party unless a party timely files a description of the factual and
legal basis on which fault can be allocated and information identifying the non-party, to the extent
known or reasonably available to the party, including name, address, telephone number and employer.
The party shall file the description and identifying information in accordance with Rule 9., Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure or as ordered by the court but in no event later than 90 days before trial as provided in
Rule 9, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2005
78-27-42 Release to one defendant does not discharge other defendants.
A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does not discharge any other
defendant unless the release so provides.
1986
78-27-43 Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indemnity, contribution.
Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any common law or statutory
immunity from liability, including, but not limited to, governmental immunity as provided in Title 63,
Chapter 30d, and the exclusive remedy provisions of Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers' Compensation Act.
Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any right to indemnity or contribution
arising from statute, contract, or agreement.
2005
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The Honorable Norman H. Bangerter
Governor, State of Utah
Dear Governor Bangerter:
I have been directed to inform you that S. B. No. 25,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY STATUTE OF LIMITATION, by Sen. K. S. Cornaby,
has been signed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House in open session and is being transmitted herewith
for your action.
Respectfully,
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Sophia C. Buckmiller
Secretary of the Senate
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February 20, 1989

Mr. President:
I am directed to inform the Senate that the House of Representatives
has this day passed S. B. No. 25, PRODUCTS LIABILITY STATUTE OF
LIMITATION, by Senator Cornaby, which has been signed by the Speaker in
open session, and the same is transmitted herewith for the signature of
the President.
Respectfully,

Carole E. Peterson
Chief Clerk
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The Senate Judiciary Standing Committee, to which was
referred S.B. 25, PRODUCTS LIABILITY STATUTE OF LIMITATION, by
Senator K. S. Cornaby, has carefully considered the bill and reports
it out of committee with a favorable recommendation*
Respectfj.

( ^Jr^-a n e Beatti

c

Committee chai

rman P r o Tern

Wy

'

^tNAlOR K. S. CORNABY

READ
Referred to Rules Committee_J!A!_!_

JAN 9-1989

First Time_

C'J

TOmcMtfY—J^H 11 m

Ordered Printed and Referred to Committee on
Reported

FEB 8-1989
Second Time.
FEB
9 -1989
Third Time

•?r,r»p

Favorable F E B ' 2 - " 1 9 8 9

AMENDMENTS

FURTHER ACTION

Committee.

FEB 6 - 1989

Second Reading.

CIRCLED FPR 8 - 1 Q g Q

UXC.3GLED

W T E - 2nd READING •• «3-^- > - ? - * -

Third Reading.

-A

j FINAL VOTE

Ye

Transmitted to House

f f ^ t>~m—

RECEIVED FROM HOUSE.

~

.Absent-

(date)

Concurred Conference Committee.

(vote)

(date)

(vote)

(date)

/- «^

SENT TO GOVERNOR

-EEM-K

FEB 2 0 1989

Concurred House Amendments

ENROLLED ^ -

&

Nays

<J> -

(date)

; - r ?

(date)

RECEIVED FROM THE SFNATF
First Time

FEB ] n v
REA

-19-

FEB 1 Q 1939

Referred to Committee on

1 5 198

cL
Reported

FEB 1 7 ^

9

FEB 1 7 1989

Second Time.
Third Time

FURTHER ACTION

AMENDMENTS
Committee
Second Reading.

Third Reading.

FINAL VOTE

Z
Yeas__fe2i

RETURNED TO SENATE.

-Nays.

-A
_3_

.Absent.

z

1Q_

-FEb & 0 1989-

Concurred Conference Committee _
(dale)

19 EEB^J) I

TabD

Westlavu
Not Reported in F.Supp.
Not Reported in F.Supp., 1989 WL 434765 (D.Utah)
(Cite as: 1989 WL 434765 (D.Utah))

HOnly the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Division.
Scott ALLEN, Plaintiff,
v.
MINNSTAR, INC., dba Genmar Industries, Inc., dba
Well-Craft Marine, and Outboard Marine Corporation, Defendant.
GENMAR INDUSTRIES, INC., dba Wellcraft Marine, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.
Mitchell HUFFMAN and Melvin Huffman, ThirdParty Defendants.
No. 86-C-1074-S.
Nov. 21, 1989.
Jackson Howard, D. David Lambert, Leslie W.
Slaugh, Howard, Lewis & Petersen, Provo, UT, for
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Snell & Wilmer, Phoenix, AZ, Stephen B. Nebeker,
Salt Lake City, UT, M. Dayle Jeffs, Jeffs & Jeffs,
Provo, UT, for defendant.
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not controverted: Mr. Allen was riding as a passenger
in a boat on August 30, 1985 when the boat swerved
causing him to be thrown from the boat into the water. While Mr. Allen was in the water the propeller
passed over him causing severe physical injury. One
result of the accident was that Mr. Allen's left leg had
to be amputated. He still carries significant scars on
his right leg and buttocks area as a result of the propeller cutting into his flesh.
Mr. Allen has since sued OMC, the manufacturer of
the engine, claiming that OMC is liable for his injuries under a strict products liability theory. Mr. Allen
couches this theory in terms of defective designalleging that the boat should have been equipped with
a propeller guard which, according to Allen, would
have prevented an accident of this kind.
OMC moved for summary judgment on the basis that
Allen was unable to present evidence on a safer alternative design which would have either prevented or
lessened his injuries. OMC's arguments before this
court focussed on the "enhanced injury theory" or
"second collision" doctrine which is that, while the
product defect did not cause the initial accident
which gave rise to the injury, some defect in the
product caused the injuries suffered by plaintiff to be
more serious than they would have been absent such
defect.— OMC points out that while the exposed
propeller did not cause Allen to be thrown into the
water (the "first" accident), it did inflict injuries after
he was in the water.

SAM, District Judge.
*1 Defendant Outboard Marine Corporation
("OMC") moved this court for summary judgment on
Plaintiff Scott Allen's ("Allen") strict products liability claim on the basis that Allen failed to satisfy the
elements of an enhanced injury claim. This court entered a bench ruling in OMC's favor, but before a
written opinion issued, Allen moved for relief from
this court's ruling based on Fed.R.Civ.P. 54, 59 and
60. This opinion supplements the court's bench ruling
on OMC's motion for summary judgment and addresses Allen's later motion for relief from that decision.
The facts on which this court bases its decision are

Allen, on the other hand, persists in his characterization of this claim as a straightforward strict liability
claim.— Under either theory, however, Allen's claim
concerning the allegedly defective product must be
dismissed as a matter of law.— Appeirently Allen
resists this characterization because of the evidentiary
showing necessary to allow his claim to proceed to
trial. To make out a prima facie case for enhanced
injury, a plaintiff must show the existence of an alternative, safer design, practicable under the circumstances, and what injuries would have resulted had
the safer design been utilized. Huddell v. Levin, 537
F.2d 726 (3d Cir.1976). As OMC pointed out in its
briefs, Allen has been unable to establish a prima
facie case for enhanced injury.

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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facts fails to overcome this presumption.
According to Allen, such a flaw is not fatal because
this is not an enhanced injury case. This court agrees
that this is not an enhanced injury case, but a design
defect case. However, OMC is still entitled to summary judgment due to Allen's inability to provide this
court with evidence that the propeller was defectively
designed-the same type of evidence necessary to
make out a prima facie enhanced injury case.
*2 The strict products liability theory is not designed
to render a manufacturer an insurer of his product.
Moreover, liability is not imposed automatically.
Instead there must be a finding that the manufacturer
somehow breached his duty to the injured party.
In all products liability cases it is required that the
plaintiff prove a causal connection between the alleged defect and the injury:
While the language employed with each recovery
theory varies, it is now clear that the tests in all 3 is
the same: the plaintiff must show 1) the existence of
a defect; 2) the attribution of the defect to the seller;
and 3) a causal relation between the defect and the
injury.
Tauber v. Nissan Motor Corp., 671 F.Supp. 1070,
1073 (D.Md.1987); see also. Olsen v. United States.
521 F.Supp. 59. 63 (E.D.Penn.l981WyV/ 688 F.2d
820 (3d Cir. 1982Vert, den. 459 U.S. 1107 0983);
Jensen v. American Motors Corp.. 50 Md.App. 226,
437 A.2d 242, 247 (1981).
Utah law creates a rebuttable presumption of nondefectiveness:
There is a rebuttable presumption that a product is
free from any defect or defective condition where the
alleged defect in the plans or designs for the product
or the methods and techniques of manufacturing,
inspecting and testing the product were in conformity
with government standards established for that industry which were in existence at the time the plans or
designs for the product or the methods and techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the
product were adopted.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(3).— The evidence before this court as outlined in the parties' undisputed

Mr. Allen has pointed to evidence in depositions
which, according to Allen, precludes summary judgment on the issue of design defect. OMC, however,
maintains that the information contained in those
depositions not only fails to preclude summary judgment, but militates in favor of summary judgment.
Allen alleges essentially that OMC is liable for Allen's injuries due to the failure to design a boat with a
prop guard which, according to Allen, would prevent
objects (including persons) from coming into contact
with the propeller. When a party alleges a design
defect, the court must determine, not whether some
other design would have been safer, but whether that
particular design is defective and unreasonably dangerous. Curtis v General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d
808, 811 (10th Cir.1981); McHargue v. Stokes Division ofPennwalt, 686 F.Supp. 1428 (D.Colo. 1988).
A factor central to the determination of whether there
is a design defect is the availability of alternative
designs. Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61,
577 P.2d 1322, 1326(1978) (u[P]laintiff s burden in a
design defect case includes a showing that there was
an 'alternative, safer design, practicable under the
circumstances/ or that 'in terms of cost, practicality
and technical possibility, the alternative design was
feasible' ") (citations omitted). If the plaintiff is unable to make such a showing, then it is not proper for
the court to submit the question of design defect to
the jury. McHargue, 686 F.Supp. at 1441; Wilson,
577P.2dat 1327.
*3 In Wilson the court held it improper to submit to
the jury plaintiffs allegation that the defendant's use
of a standard aircraft engine constituted a defect simply because "an engine of a different type, or with a
different carburetor system, would be safer in one
particular." Wilson, 577 P.2d at 1327. According to
the court:
It is not proper to submit such allegations to the jury
unless the court is satisfied that there is evidence
from which the jury could find the suggested alternatives are not only technically feasible but also practicable in terms of cost and the over-all design and
operation of the product. It is part of the required
proof that a design feature is a "defect" to present
such evidence.
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In resisting the motion for summary judgment, Allen
has repeatedly referenced the depositions of its experts which, according to Allen, would testify as to
the design and workability of a prop guard. However,
Allen offers no evidence that such a design was
commercially available at the time the stern drive left
OMC's hands. The guard that Allen's expert (Chadwell) testified should have been utilized did not even
exist until 1989-more than ten years after OMC's
involvement in the manufacturing process and four
years after Allen was injured by the propeller. Allen's
experts have also admitted that a propeller guard affects boat performance, yet Allen has provided no
evidence to this court that consumers would accept
the diminished performance. Finally, plaintiffs experts have testified that prop guards are only theoretically possible.
Without evidence of technically feasible alternative
designs at the time the product was manufactured, a
jury trial on the design defect issue is inappropriate.
This court is unwilling to set a new precedent in
products liability law by imposing liability on manufacturers whose products conform to the safety standards of the industry, but do not-incorporate every
possible safety feature regardless of cost or effect on
performance of the manufacturer's product. For those
reasons this court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant OMC.
Allen has moved for reconsideration of the court's
decision based on Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), 59(a)(2) and
60(b). Allen, however, fails to present this court with
compelling reasons which support such a request.
Rule 54(b) provides that any judgment on fewer than
all of the claims "is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties."
That rule does not provide a basis which compels this
court to reconsider its previous decision, especially
when Allen has simply reiterated his previous arguments.
Rule 59(a)(2) applies specifically to motions for new
trials. No trial has been had in this case, therefore
Allen's reliance on Rule 59(a)(2) is misplaced.
Finally, Allen suggests that Rule 60(b) entitles him to

reconsideration of the court's decision. However,
Allen relies on no new arguments in seeking the
court's reconsideration of the summary judgment
decision. He relies on the fact that the court intended
to supplement the earlier ruling disregarding the fact
that to supplement means to "explain" not to change.
Allen also complains that he had insufficient time in
which to respond to OMC's motion. However, the
court allowed supplemental briefs after the hearing
which, had there been any prejudice, would have
effectively negated such prejudice. Furthermore, Allen has taken the opportunity to brief once more for
this court the reasons he feels summary judgment
should not have been granted. Still he has failed to
make any new arguments which might persuade this
court to reconsider its earlier decision. Accordingly,
the court's decision stands.
FN1. The "enhanced injury" theory is not
limited in its application to instances
wherein an automobile passenger has been
injured, but has also been applied to boating
accidents. See Rubin v. Brutus Corp., 487
So.2d 360 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986).
FN2. Allen suggests that an enhanced injury
claim can only be thus characterized if a
plaintiff suffers an injury in addition to the
one for which he sues. For example Allen
states that if "the bone in plaintiffs leg had
been shattered by a blunt impact with the
outdrive system and that same leg was then
injured by the propeller, this might be an
enhanced injury case...." Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant OMC's
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of
its Motion For Summary Judgment, p. 3.
However, the enhanced injury' theory does
not require that an injury precede the one for
which a plaintiff sues. Huddell v. Levin, 537
F.2d 726 (3rd Cir. 1976) (defective design of
head restraint caused fatal head injury when
decedent's non-moving car was rear-ended
by car moving- 50 m.p.h.). The theory is
rather that the injury that would have been
suffered absent a defect is "enhanced" in
terms of its severity due to the alleged defective design of a product.
FN3. Summary judgment is appropriate
when there are no issues of material fact

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Not Reported in F.Supp.
Not Reported in F.Supp., 1989 WL 434765 (D.Utah)
(Cite as: 1989 WL 434765 (D.Utah))

which preclude judgment on the pleadings.
All of the evidence before the court, however, must be construed in favor of the nonmoving party.
FN4. The same statute also provides that:
(1) No product shall be considered to have
a defect or to be in a defective condition,
unless at the time the product was sold by
the manufacturer or other initial seller,
there was a defect or defective condition
in the product which made the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.
(2) As used in this act, "unreasonably
dangerous" means that the product was
dangerous to an extent beyond which
would be contemplated by the ordinary
and prudent buyer, consumer or user of
that product in that community considering the product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers and uses together with
any actual knowledge, training, or experience possessed by that particular buyer,
user or consumer.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(1 >(2V
D.Utah, 1989.
Allen v. Minnstar, Inc.
Not Reported in F.Supp., 1989 WL 434765 (D.Utah)
END OF DOCUMENT
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INTRODUCTION

Since its formal recognition by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals nearly thirty years ago,1 the doctrine variously known as "en* Associate, The Oldham Law Firm, Englewood, Colorado; J.D. 1992, University of
Colorado; B A . 1988, Colorado State University, Highest Distinction.
** Owner, The Oldham Law Finn, Englewood, Colorado; JX>. 1963, University of
Michigan.
1. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 R2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (applying Minnesota
law).
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hanced injury,"2 "erashworthiness,"3 or "second collision"4 has
become firmly entrenched in American product liability law. These
three terms are most often used interchangeably to refer to the broad
spectrum of cases based on claims that injuries sustained in an accident were aggravated or exacerbated due to a product defect,
although the defect itself was not a cause of the original accident.
Enhanced injury liability has grown into one of the most highly
litigated and costly areas of tort law today. A successful claim often
results in the imposition of multimillion dollar liability. These complex cases, whether successful or not, result in substantial cost to the
judicial system and to our society. The uncertainty which presently
exists in enhanced injury theory inappropriately encourages litigation,
resulting in even greater costs. Thus, unchecked, careless, or confusing expansion of the doctrine poses a genuine threat to the ability of
American manufacturers to compete in worldwide markets, as well as
to the ability of average Americans to afford products and equipment
as rising litigation and settlement costs continue to be passed on to
consumers and businesses.
As the American Law Institute prepares to adopt the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability (Restatement (Third)), containing
a section entitled "Increased Harm Due to Product Defect," serious
2. The term "enhanced injury" refers to the degree accident injuries are aggravated,
due to an alleged defect, over and above that which would otherwise have been sustained
absent the alleged defect. 2A Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIA-

BILITY § 21.03, at 21-28 to 21-29 (1991) (revised by Cary S. Sklaren (1994)); Michael Hoenig, Resolution of "Crashworthiness" Design Claims, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 633, 634 n 3
(1981).
3. "Crashworthiness* is defined in the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings
Act as "the protection that a passenger motor vehicle affords its passengers against personal injury or death as a result of a motor vehicle accident." 15 U.S.C. § 1901(14) (1976).
For several judicial definitions of the term, see Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489
F2d 1066,1069 n 3 (4th Cir. 1974)."
4. "Second collision" usually refers to the actual physical impact between a passenger and an interior part of the vehicle or something exterior to the vehicle following the
primary impact Hoenig, supra note 2, at 634 n.2.
Some commentators, have attempted to make distinctions between the enhanced injury, erashworthiness, and second collision terms. See W. James Foiand, Enhanced Injury:
Problems of Proof in "Second Collision" and "Crashworthy" Cases, 16 WASHBURN LJ.
600,606-07 (1977). Mr. Foiand describes a "somewhat obtuse" distinction between second
collision cases involving an actual secondary physical impact between the injured party and
a specific part of the interior or exterior of the vehicle, and erashworthiness cases based
upon an "'environmental* definition of intended use." Id However, because the doctrine's broad applicability can be masked by use of the "second collision" or "erashworthiness" labels, "enhanced injury" is the more accurate term to describe such claims and will
be utilized throughout this Article. See Thomas V. Harris, Enhanced Injury Theory: An
Analytic Framework, 62 N.C L. REV. 643, 647-48 (1984); FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra
note 2, § 21.03, at 21-27 to 21-28.
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consideration must be given to underlying policy and the potential
long-term effects of such a pronouncement on enhanced injury liability.5 A major consideration must be the significant benefits which
would inure from a uniform approach, adopted not only by the new
Restatement (Third), but also by the courts and perhaps even by the
United States Congress.
This Article examines the historical development of the enhanced
injury doctrine, discusses elements of the enhanced injury claim, including areas of controversy such as the burden of proof of enhancement, and presents a brief overview of recent case law and trends in
the Nineties. Part II of this Article then analyzes the substance and
practical effect of the proposed Restatement (Third) section on enhanced injury, concluding that it does not accurately reflect important
underlying considerations of logic, policy, and theory, nor does it provide a uniform approach fairly balancing the interests of the consumer
and industry.
II.

A

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENHANCED INJURY DOCTRINE

1968: Larsen v. General Motors Corp.

The enhanced injury theory was first adopted by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1968 in Larsen v. General Motors Corp.6 At
that time, "products liability" was a relatively young body of law ancf
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was only three
years old. The Larsen court was highly aware of the events going on
around it and the changing attitudes of American society regarding
safety, expressly noting National Safety Council statistics regarding
automobile accident-related deaths and disabling injuries "since the
advent of the horseless carriage."7 In addition, the court acknowledged the recently enacted National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
5.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 11, at 253 (Council

Draft No. 2.1994) [hereinafter Council Draft No. 2]. One need look no further than Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A to realize the potential influence of a novel Restatement
section on enhanced injury. See Charles E. Cantu, Reflections on Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: A Mirror Crack W, 25 GONZ. L. REV. 205 (1989-90). Professor
Cantu's article reveals that § 402A was not an accepted doctrine when it was adopted in
1965 and has since been a "catalyst to a multitude of litigation** as interpretations of
§ 402A stray farther and farther from its drafters' intentions. Id. at 206-07,211,236. The
American Law Institute should take care to avoid similar results from the new Restatement
(Third).
6. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (applying Minnesota law).
7. Id. at 502 n.4.
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Act of 1966,B emphasizing that the court was merely complementing
such legislative activity in the judicial sphere and reflecting the social,
political and, economic climate surrounding it.9
The Larsen case presents a classic example of a true "second collision" injury. The plaintiff sustained severe head injuries in a head-on
collision when the impact allegedly caused the steering mechanism of
his 1963 Chevrolet Corvair to thrust rearward, striking him in the
head.10 The plaintiff argued that the steering assembly was defectively
designed, causing him to receive additional injuries or more severe
injuries than he would have otherwise received in the collision absent
the defect. The defendant contended that it had no duty to design and
manufacture a vehicle that is safe to occupy during a collision.11 The
trial court agreed with General Motors and granted summary judgment in its favor.
In the Larsen decision, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, rejected Evans v. General Motors Corp.,12 and reversed the trial court
holding that manufacturers have a duty to use reasonable care in the
design of vehicles to avoid subjecting users to unreasonable risks of
injury in the event of a collision. Applying general negligence principles, the court emphasized that a manufacturer's duty extends to producing a product that is reasonably fit for its intended use and free of
hidden defects.13 Central to the court's holding was its recognition
that collisions, with or without the fault of the driver, are a clearly
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1966). The purpose of the Safety Act was "to reduce
traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents" by
establishing safety standards for vehicles and equipment, as well as by undertaking and
supporting safety research and development Id § 1381j. For legislative history of the Act,
see H.R. REP. NO. 1776,89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); S. REP. NO. 1301,89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2709, 2709; CONF. REP. NO. 1919, 89th C&ng., 2d
Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.CCA.N. 2709, 2731. The National TVaffic Safety Bureau (later the National Highway TVaffic Safety Administration, or "NHTSA") was created
soon after to cany out the legislative mandate. See Exec. Order No. 11357, 32 Fed. Reg.
8225 (1967).
9. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 506; FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 21.01, at 21-2 to
21-5.
10. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 496-97.
11. At at 497.
12. 359 F.2d 822, 824 (7tb Cir.), cert denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966) (concluding in »
divided decision applying Indiana law that manufacturers are under no duiy to make
automobiles accident-proof nor to render vehicles safer when the danger to be avoided is
obvious and collisions are not an intended use of automobiles; such claims are not actionable as a matter of law), overruled by Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104,110 (7th Cir.
1977).
13. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 501.
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foreseeable and statistically inevitable result of the "intended use" of
automobiles.14
The Larsen court spoke only in terms of unreasonable risks of
enhanced injury and disclaimed any duty to design accident-proof vehicles or to insure their use.15 Further, the court pointedly emphasized that:
Any design defect not causing the accident would not subject
the manufacturer to liability for the entire damage, but the manufacturer should be liable for that portion of the damage or injury caused by the defective design over and above the damage
or injury that probably would have occurred as a result of the
impact or collision absent the defective design.16
One commentator has described this as a "newly minted liability . . .
limited to only those injuries which were actually enhanced by the [alleged] defect."17
B.

Post-1968: Acceptance and Expansion of Larsen

After some early resistance,18 the enhanced injury doctrine originally adopted by the Larsen court appears to have been unanimously
accepted by American jurisdictions.19 In Blankenship v. General Motors Corp.,20 the highest court of West Virginia recognized in 1991 that
it had become thefinalstate to accept the doctrine.21 Moreover, theo14. Id. at 501-02. The court cited authority stating that between one-fourth to twothirds of all automobiles are involved in an accident producing injury or death at some
time during their useful life. Id. at 502.
15. Id. at 503.
16. Id. The concept of "enhanced injury" originates from this language in the Larsen
decision.
17. Hoenig, supra note 2, at 637; see also FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 21.02,
at 21-18 (noting that the Larsen court was quite careful to limit the portion of liability
which affixed to the enhanced injury defect).
18.

See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 21.02, at 21-14 n.25 & 21-18 n.48.

19. Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 11, Reporters* Note to cmt. a, at 265. For
exhaustive listings of state and federal decisions following Larsen, see FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 21.02, at 21-19 n.50; Barry Levenstam & Daryl J. Lapp, Plaintiffs
Burden of Proving Enhanced Injury in Crashworthiness Cases: A Clash Worthy of Analysis, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 55, 61 n33 (1988).

20. 406 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1991).
21. The court, however, based its decision to adopt the enhanced injury doctrine principally on the practical realization that, HWest Virginians . . . are already paying the product liability insurance premium when they buy a . . . car, so this Court would be both
foolish and irresponsible if we held that while West Virginians must pay the premiums,
West Virginians can't collect the insurance after they're injured." Id. at 785. The court
goes on to reject the burden of proof requirements of Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d
Cir. 1976), for the same reasons, stating that although the Huddell standard makes a great
deal of sense and perhaps should be the national standard in crashworthiness cases, "West
Virginians are not going to pay product liability insurance premiums so that all the resi-
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ries of enhanced injury have been applied far beyond the realm of
automobiles to products ranging from airplanes,22 to fabrics,23 to riding lawn mowers,24 to water ski bindings.25 This expansion is supported by the Larsen decision which made it clear that the duty
recognized was one of general application to all products and was not
limited to automobiles.26 Indeed, one commentator has stated that
enhanced injury is "truly an area limited only by the imagination of
counsel/'27 Unfortunately, this expansion in application has often
been accompanied by an unwarranted expansion of the theory itself as
many courts lose sight of the policies underlying Larsen, ultimately
resulting in the expansion of liability by these courts and now in the
proposed Restatement (Third).28
The federal courts, rather than the state courts, have led the way
in adopting the enhanced injury theory and in defining its parameters29 under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.30 Many key decisions,
including Larsen31 Huddell32 Caiazzo33 Mitchell,34 and Fox35 were
dents of the 10th Circuit, where Fox v. Ford Motor Co. was decided, can collect the benefits." Blankenship, 406 S.E.2d at 786 (citation omitted); see infra notes 58-127 and
accompanying text.
22. Eg., Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 890 ¥26 1540,1550 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying New Mexico law).
23. Eg.t Howard v. McCrory Corp., 601 R2d 133,137 (4th Cir. 1979) (applying Maryland law).
24. Tafoya v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 884 R2d 1330, 1338 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying
Colorado law). But see Mile Hi Concrete, Inc. v. Matz, 842 P.2d 198, 206-07 n.17 (Colo.
1992) (disagreeing with the holding in Tafoya).
25. Holdsworth v. Nash Mfg., Inc., 409 N.W.2d 764,768 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). For an
extensive listing of additional products to which plaintiffs have argued the enhanced injury
doctrine should apply, although not always successfully, see FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra
note 2, § 21.02, at 21-26 n.l.
26. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 504; Hoenig, supra note 2, at 647.
27. Foland, supra note 4, at 621; see also Harris, supra note 4, at 648-49 (noting that
the concept of recovery for enhanced injury is broad).
28. See infra notes 79-127.
29. See, e.g.y Harris, supra note 4, at 644; FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 21.01,
at 21-24 to 21-26. Hoenig stated:
In this struggle, [between the Evans and Larsen approaches] the federal courts
seemed to play an important role as they hazarded "Erie-educated guesses," regarding the approach state courts would adopt if faced with the threshold legal
issue. Nevertheless, since a court opting to follow Larsen will be markedly extending products liability, the Erie task has been viewed with discomfort.
Hoenig, supra note 2, at 638-39 (footnotes omitted).
30. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
31. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
32. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
33. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 647 F.2d 241 (2d Gr. 1981).
34. Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982).
35. Fox v. Ford Motor Co.. 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978).
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decided by district and circuit court judges. However, in what some
have termed a classic example of "the cart leading the horseless carriage/' no state court has disagreed with the adoption of the enhanced
injury theory by the federal judiciary.36
Although most often applied to alleged design defects, the enhanced injury theory is equally applicable to manufacturing or warning defects.37 Since 1968 and Larsen, the enhanced injury doctrine has
also been expanded to apply to causes of action based on strict liability and breach of warranty theories, as well as negligence.38 However,
recent developments have seen an increasing rejection of strict liability in judging alleged design and warning defects because increasing
numbers of courts and commentators recognize that a single cause of
action based on negligence principles and applied through a
risk-utility balancing test represents the more equitable approach.39
36. FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 21.02, at 21-26.
37. See, e.g., Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 398 A 2 d 490,494 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1979), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., General Motors Corp. v Lahocki, 410 A.2d
1039 (Md. 1980) (discussing inadequate roof welds); Holdsworth v. Nash Mfg., 409 N.W2d
764, 767-68 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing manufacturing and testing defects in water
ski binding); Krein v. Raudabough, 406 N.W.2d 315,320 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (finding in
a failure to warn case, that dashboard, steering column, and other components of armored
truck had unreasonably dangerous energy-absorbing properties).
38. See, e.g., Duran v. General Motors Corp., 688 P.2d 779,782 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983)
(recognizing that crashworthiness claims are actionable in negligence, strict liability, and
breach of warranty); Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Liability of Manufacturer, Seller, or
Distributor of Motor Vehicle for Defect Which Merely Enhances Injury From Accident
Otherwise Caused, 42 AX.R3d 560, § 2[a], at 564 (1972).
39. See, e.g., Hoenig, supra note 2, at 659-71. Mr. Hoenig stresses that the appropriate predicate for design defect liability is fault and that case law indicates that negligenceoriented reasonableness criteria must be applied in crash design cases regardless of the
strict liability label. Id. at 659, 670; see also Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W2d 176,
185-86 (Mich. 1984) (adopting a negligencerisk-utilitytest in design defect cases); MODEL
UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,723-24 (1979)

(noting that courts have never imposed strict liability in a design defect case); Council
Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 2 cmt. 1, at 49-50 (analyzing the incompatibility of negligence
and strict liability in regards to the same facts); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 644-45 (4th ed. 1971) (discussing the use of negligence principles in
cases purportedly applying strict liability); Sheila L. Bimbaum, Unmasking the Test for
Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 593, 603 (1980) (exploring the return to negligence in strict liability actions after
California rejected the terminology in § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts); James
A. Henderson, Jr., Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design: Toward
the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REV. 773,777-78 (1979) (supporting separation of strict liability and negligence despite substantially identical cost-benefit
analysis); Frank J. Vandal!, "Design Defect" in Products Liability: Rethinking Negligence
and Strict Liability, 43 OHIO ST. LJ. 61, 83-84 (1982) (outlining ten factors of a balancing
test to be considered in strict liability cases), John W. Wade, On Product "Design Defects"
and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 551, 577 (1980) (noting combination of negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability to create a single cause of action).
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Elements and Troublesome Developments

The elements of the enhanced injury claim, whether in negligence
or in strict liability, are the same as the general elements of any other
tort claim, requiring the claimant to establish that: (1) the defendant
owed a duty to the claimant; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3)
the breach was a proximate cause of injury to the claimant; and (4) the
claimant suffered damage.40 One commentator has modified these
traditional tort elements to reflect the unique aspects of an enhanced
injury claim, concluding that an enhanced injury claimant must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) a "breach of a duty owed to
the claimant"; (2) that "the breach caused an enhancement of damage
over and above what would otherwise have occurred"; and (3) "the
extent to whiich the damage was enhanced as a result of the breach of
duty."41 Like any other traditional tort claim, the claimant bears the
burden of proof on each of these elements in order to present a prima
facie case.42
For the most part, enhanced injury litigation offers no unique
problems with respect to these tort elements. However, issues such as
the burden of proving the extent of the enhanced injury, the perceived
40. See PROSSER, supra note 39, § 30; Harris, supra note 4, at 651.
41. Harris, supra note 4, at 657. Mr. Harris has further refined these elements to
reflect the sequential factual proof that a claimant must offer in order to allow the trier of
fact to perform the following six functions:
(1) determine that the defendant breached a duty owed to the claimant; (2) evaluate the full nature, extent, and consequences of the injuries actually received in
the accident; (3) quantify the severity of the impact imparted to both the object at
issue and to the person or property injured after impact; (4) define, with a meaningful degree of specificity, the alternative, safer design(s) that claimant alleges
the defendant should have used; (5) evaluate the full nature, extent, and consequences of the injuries, if any, that the claimant hypo the tically would have suffered in the very same accident if the alternative, safer design had been used; and
(6) calculate in terms of a damage award the difference be! ween the injuries actually suffered and those that hypothetically would have been suffered if the alternative, safei design had been used.
Id. at 662.
42. See Edward T. O'Donneil, Public Policy and the Burden of Proof in Enhanced
Injury Litigation- A Case Study in the Dangers of Trends and Easy Assumptions, 17 W. ST.
U. L. REV. 325, 353 (1990) ("Whatever its imperfections, die traditional allocation of the
burden of proof keeps pressure on each side to come forward with the best evidence it can
find. A shift in the burden could destroy that balance/'); see also Robert C. Reichert,
Limitations on Manufacturer Liability in Second Collision Actions, 43 MONT. L. REV. 109,
115-16 (1982) ("Applying traditional legal principles, the party that initiated the complaint
and stands to benefit from the proof—the plaintiff—has the burden. In all strict liability
actions it is the plaintiffs burden to prove the defective design; in second collision cases,
the plaintiff proves defective design by establishing the existence and magnitude of enhanced injuries.").
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"indivisibility" of some injuries, the "apportionment" of injuries, and
the imposition of joint and several liability have generated controversy among courts and commentators struggling to equitably define
and apply the enhanced injury doctrine.
i.

Duty

Enhanced injury liability is based on the premise that some products, while not made for the purpose of undergoing impacts or becoming involved in accidents, should nevertheless be reasonably designed
to minimize the potential injury-producing effect of such impacts or
accidents.43 It is important to note that the duty recognized by the
Larsen court was limited to reasonable care to protect against unreasonable risks of enhanced injury.44 While foreseeability is an essential
element in determining the scope of such a duty, it is not synonymous
with duty.45 In attempting to establish the parameters of a manufacturer's duty to minimize the risk of enhanced injury, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the limits of foreseeability and
struggled to provide a rational approach to the question of unreasonable risk in Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk AG., stating: "[Njearly
every accident situation, [involving an automobile] no matter how bizarre, is 'foreseeable' if only because in the lastfiftyyears drivers have
discovered just about every conceivable way of wrecking an automobile."46 The court further recognized that the concept of unreasonable risk involves the balancing of many factors and depends to some
degree upon the circumstances surrounding the particular accident.47
A manufacturer's duty to minimize the risk of enhanced injury is
clearly not absolute.48 Thus, many courts have emphasized that manufacturers do not have a duty to produce an "accident-proof'49 or
"fool-proof50 vehicle, or even one that "floats on water"51 or has the
"strength and crash-damage resistance features of an M-2 Army
43. Harris, supra note 4, at 646.
44. Larsen, 391 R2d at 502.
45. Harris, supra note 4, at 654; Hoenig, supra note" 2, at 638 n.19; Kelly CarbettaScandy, Note, Litigating Enhanced Injury Cases: Complex Issues, Empty Precedents, and
Unpredictable Results, 54 CINN. L. REV. 1257,1275 (1986).
46. 489 R2d 1066,1070 (4th Or. 1974) (citing Michael Hoenig & Stephen J. Werber,
Automobile "Crashworthiness": An Untenable Doctrine, 1971 INS. LJ. 583, 595).
47. Id. at 1071; see also discussion of Dreisonstok and its duty analysis in Poland, supra
note 4, at 605-06; Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 45, at 1275.
48. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503; Harris, supra note 4, at 652; Carbetta-Scandy, supra note
45, at 1275.
49. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 502.

50. Guazzo,647F.2dat247.
51. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 502.
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tank."52 Ultimately, the question of the scope of a manufacturer's
duty is one of fairness.53
2. Defect
Once it is established that the manufacturer owed a duty to the
claimant, the claimant must show a breach of that duty by proving the
existence of a defect.54 An enhanced injury claimant must prove the
existence of a design defect by showing that a reasonable alternative
design, practicable under the circumstances, would have provided better protection against enhanced injuries in an accident.55 Most courts
and commentators agree that a plaintiff alleging a design defect must
present qualitative evidence of a safer, alternative design which not
only must have been possible, but must have been practicably feasible
or reasonably achievable under technology available at the time of the
product's manufacture.56 The requirement of proof of the existence
of a reasonable alternative design does not enlarge the plaintiffs burden of proof, as plaintiffs have always borne the burden of proving the
existence of a defect, and proof of a reasonable alternative design is
merely a part of that burden.57
3. Burden of Proof
Following the rationale of Larsen, most jurisdictions expressly
recognize that the manufacturer is potentially liable only for the enhanced injuries over and above those that would have occurred absent
the alleged defect, and that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving
that the alleged defect caused the enhanced injuries.58 However, con52. Roberts v. May, 583 P.2d 305, 308 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978) (quoting Melia v. Ford
Motor Co., 534 R2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (Bright, J., dissenting)).
53. Harris, supra note 4, at 655.
54. Because the vast majority of enhanced injury cases involve claims of design defect,
the following discussion will focus on proof of design defects, rather than manufacturing
defects which are proven by a relatively straightforward showing that the product as manufactured did not conform to the manufacturing specifications.
55. Hoenig, supra note 2, at 634 n.3.
56. Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 2 cmt. c, at 22-28 and cmt d, at 28-34; Hoenig, supra note 2, at 637 n.17,685; Stanton P. Beck, Comment,, Enhanced Injury: A Direction for Washington, 61 WASH. L. REV. 571,590 (1986); Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 45, at
1264 n36. Contra Kudlacek v. Hat S.p.A.. 509 N.W.2d 603,611 (Neb. 1994) ("Nebraska no
longer requires proof of an alternative design for a claimant to recover under a claim of
defective design").
57. Hoenig, supra note 2, at 688.
58. FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 21.04[1], at 21-35; James O. Pearson, Jr.,
Annotation, Products Liability: Sufficiency of Proof of Injuries Resulting From "Second
Collision," 9 A L.R.4th 494 § 2, at 497 (1981); Foland, supra note 4, at 608-09; Harris,
supra note 4, at 656; Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 19, at 62; Reichert, supra note 42, at
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troversy has arisen over the way in which the plaintiffs burden of
proof of causation may be met. In fact, the question of who should
bear the burden of proving the extent of enhanced injuries has generated more controversy than any other single issue arising out of the
enhanced injury doctrine.
Decisions faithful to the theoretical underpinnings of the enhanced injury theory require proof of the extent of enhanced injuries
as a part of the plaintiffs prima facie case.59 The seminal case adopting this approach is Huddell v. Levin.60 In this case Dr. Huddel! was
sitting in his Chevrolet Nova after it had run out of gas on a bridge.
Shortly thereafter, his car was struck from behind by another vehicle
traveling at a speed of fifty to sixty miles per hour.61 The impact allegedly forced Dr. HuddelFs head back into the head restraint, resulting
in a fatal skull fracture.62 Huddell's widow brought suit against the
manufacturer, claiming that the defective design of the head restraint
caused her husband's death. In reversing a jury verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that enhanced
injury cases "require a highly refined and almost invariably difficult
presentation of proof'63 which the plaintiff had failed to sustain,
including:
1. that there existed at the time of the accident, an alternative,
safer, more practicable product design;
2. that plaintiff would have sustained a less severe injury had
such alternative design been used, by offering proof of what
injuries, if any, would have been sustained with the alternative design; and
3. a method of establishing the extent of enhanced injury attributable to the design defect.64
In a concurring opinion that would eventually become quite influential, Judge Rosenn objected to the majority's second and third requirements of proof on the basis that there may be circumstances
under which they would be "unreasonably burdensome to an innocent
113-14; Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 45, at 1258; Kerry A. Shad, Note, Warren v. Colombo:
North Carolina Recognizes Claim for Enhanced Injury, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1330,1338 (1990);
see also Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762,774 (5th Or. 1976); RichaTdson v.
Volkswagenwerk A.G., 552 R Supp. 73, 81-83 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
59. Harris, supra note 4, at 657.
60. 537 F.2d 726, 737-38 (3d Cir. 1976) (applying New Jersey law).
61. la\ at 732.
62. Id at 731. An autopsy showed that Dr. Huddell suffered no other significant injuries in the collision. Id,
63. Id at 737.
64. Id. at 737-38.
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plaintiff/'65 Judge Rosenn believed that the wrongdoer causing the
initial accident and the wrongdoer causing the enhanced injury should
instead be treated as "concurrent tortfeasors," with the burden of
proving apportionment of injury shifting to the defendant pursuant to
section 433B;(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.66
The Huddell majority, on the other hand, did not perceive that
enhanced injury litigation fit into the concepts of concurrent
tortfeasor actions which combine, contemporaneously, to cause an injury.67 Instead, the court emphasized that "[analogies to concurrent
actions combining to cause a single impact are simply not applicable"
where the driver who caused the original impact is liable for all of the
injuries, and the manufacturer is liable only for the enhanced
injuries.68
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk AG. 69 This case involved a Volkswagen minibus which was rear-ended by a car traveling at a speed of
fifty to sixty-five miles per hour. The collision caused the minibus to
spin and roll over, ejecting the Caiazzos, who were unrestrained, and
causing them serious injury.70 In reversing a jury verdict in favor of
65. Id at 7<M (Rosenn, J., concurring).
66. Id at 745. Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
[WJhere the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring about
harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his liability on
the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment among them, the burden of
proof as to the apportionment is upon each such actor.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(2) (1965).

This approach has been criticized as an example of courts:
mistakenly abdicating] [their] responsibility . . . , failing to engage in a critical
analysis of either the Restatement rule or the theoretical basis on which the second collision doctrine rests. The Restatement requires a defendant to go forward
with proof of apportionment because he is the one who seeks to rely on it to
relieve himself of liability for all or a portion of the damages. However, in a
second colliirion-crashworthy case, the defendant has no liability absent proof of
enhanced injury. Therefore the plaintiff is the one who relies on proof of apportionment to establish his cause of action.
Poland, supra note 4, at 615. Moreover, if courts are going to look to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts for guidance in enhanced injury cases, other provisions and their comments are instructive, such as § 879 (dealing with liability for concurring or consecutive
independent acts; comment b makes clear that this section does not apply in an enhanced
injury setting) and §§ 323 and 324A (dealing with the liability of one providing a service,
rather than a product, for increased risk of harm to the claimant or his property).
67. Huddell, 537 R2d at 738.
68. Id\ see abo Shad, supra note 58, at 1338 (arguing that the principles of joint and
several liability require the manufacturer be held liable only for the enhanced injury, not
the entire injury).
69. 647 F2cl 241, 252 (2d Cur. 1981) (applying New York law).
70. Id at 243-44.
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the plaintiffs due to insufficient proof, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that "the plaintiff should be required to prove the extent of the enhanced injuries attributable to the defective design"71
and that proof requires a showing of the actual nature and extent of
the injuries aggravated.72 The court felt that the theoretical underpinnings of the enhanced injury doctrine require the plaintiff to sustain
this burden in order to avoid speculation.73
The Huddell-Caiazzo approach has been followed by many jurisdictions74 and has been widely praised by commentators as consistent
with both the theoretical underpinnings of Larsen and with broader
themes of product liability law.75 The Huddell and Caiazzo courts
71. Id. at 250.
72. Id. at 251.
73. Id. at 246.
74. See, eg., O'Bryan v. Volkswagen of Am., 39 F3d 1182,1994 WL 599450, at *4 (6th
Or. Nov. 1,1994) (applying Kentucky law in an unpublished disposition); Chretien v. General Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 231,1992 WL 67356, at *9 (4th Cir. Apr. 6,1992) (applying
Virginia law in an unpublished disposition); Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 890 R2d
1540, 1546 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying New Mexico law); Barris v. Bob's Drag Chutes &
Safety Equip., Inc., 685 F.2d 94,100 (3d Cir. 1982) (applying Pennsylvania law); Seese v.
Volkswagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 844-49 (3d Cir.) (applying North Carolina law), cert
denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981); Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 R2d 808, 813 (10th Cir.
1981) (applying Colorado law); Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950,960 (3d Cir. 1980)
(applying New Jersey law), cert denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981); Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 R2d 151,158 (4th Or. 1978) (applying South Carolina law); Higginbotham
v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762,773-74 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying Georgia law); Endicott
v. Nissan Motor Corp., 141 Cal. Rptr. 95,100-01 (Ct. App. 1977); Mastennan v. Veldman's
Equip., Inc., 530 N.E.2d 312,317 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d
224. 226 (Iowa 1992); Hillrichs v. Avco Corp., 478 N.W2d 70, 75 (Iowa 1991); Wernimont
v. International Harvester Corp., 309 N.W.2d 137, 140-41 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981); Armstrong v. Lorino, 580 So. 2d 528, 530 (La. Ct. App. 1991); Andrews v. Harley Davidson,
Inc., 796 P.2d 1092, 1095 (Nev. 1990); McLaughlin v. Nissan Motor Corp., 630 A.2d 857,
860 (N J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993); Duran v. General Motors Corp., 688 P.2d 779,786^87
(N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Garcia v. Rivera, 553 N.Y.S.2d 378, 380 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990);
Cornier v. Spagna, 475 N.Y.S.2d 7, 10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 577 F26 1322,1326 (Or. 1978); Kupetz v. Deere & Co., 644 A.2d 1213,1218 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1994); Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 522 ?2d 829, 833-34 (Wash.
1974); see also pre-Htiddell decisions: Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 489 F.2d
1066, 1074-76 (4th Or. 1974) (applying Virginia law); Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349,
1361 (M.D. Pa. 1978), affd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Pennsylvania law);
Yetter v. Rajeski, 364 F. Supp. 105, 107-09 (D.NJ. 1973) (applying New Jersey law);
LiPuma v. County of Rockland, 367 N.Y.S.2d 149,153 (N.Y. Sup. Q . 1975).
75. FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 21.04[1], at 21-26 (stating that the Huddell
approach clearly represents uthe current and better view** and is eminently fair to all litigants in that it places the burden of proof where it properly belongs, on the plaintiff, to
prove with particularity the injuries that have been enhanced); Poland, supra note 4, at
613-16; Harris, supra note 4, at 660-65; Hoenig, supra note 2, at 69£-706; Levenstam &
Lapp, supra note 19, at 75; O'Donnell, supra note 42, at 330-36; Reichert, supra note 42, at
114-16; Nicholas J. Wittner, Crashworthiness Litigation: Principles and Proofs 1992, (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H4-5145,1992); Carbetta-Scandy,
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properly recognized that the plaintiff asserting an enhanced injury
claim must prove the extent of the injuries enhanced by the alleged
product defect, as well as the injuries which would have been caused
by the reasonable alternative design, in order to establish' the existence of a defect, proximate causation, and thus, liability.76 In other
words, there can be no liability unless there is a difference between
the actual injury sustained and the hypothetical injury which would
have been expected to occur under the same circumstances had the
design been different.77 If a claimant fails to prove that the injuries
sustained were aggravated beyond that which would have occurred
had a safer alternative design been used, the claimant fails to prove
the fact of enhancement.78
However, perceived difficulties of proof under the enhanced injury doctrine have led some jurisdictions to stray from the theoretical
supra note 45, at 1264-69; Jo Anne Clark, Note, Second Collision Liability: A Critique of
Two Approaches to Plaintiffs Burden of Proof 68 IOWA L. REV. 811, 812, 815-19 (1983);
Shad, supra note 58, at 1337-38. But see Gerald F. Tietz et al., Crashworthiness and Erie:
Determining State Law Regarding the Burden of Proving and Apportioning Damages, 62
TEMP. L. REV. 587, 604 (1989) (suggesting that in requiring the plaintiff to prove the exact
extent to which each tortfeasor's conduct caused injury, the Huddell court increased the
plaintiffs traditional burden of proof and created a new and more burdensome prima facie
case not required in other strict liability actions; moreover, the necessity of conjectural
evidence converts a crashworthiness action into a trial of a hypothetical case, inviting supposition and speculation by the jury); Beck, supra note 56, alt 581-85, 596 (rejecting the
Huddell approach as unfair and too harsh, although the author does recognize the inapplicability of concurrent tortfeasor and joint and several liability concepts under the Larsen
holding which in effect precludes the possibility of finding a manufacturer jointly and severally liable for all damages except perhaps in the rare case where the defective design can
be shown to have caused all the injuries).
However, the Tietz article wrongly predicted that Pennsylvania state courts would not
follow Huddell. Tietz et al., supra at 581; see Kupetz v. Deere & Co., 644 A.2d 1213,1219
(Pa. Super. Ct. J 994), discussed infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
76. Clark, supra note 75, at 817-18; Reichert, supra note 42, at 114. Mr. Reichert
explains that because the alleged defective design is the cause of enhanced injuries, absent
enhanced injuries, there is no defect. Thus, proof of enhanced injuries implies the existence of the defect and a causal relationship between the defect and enhanced injuries.
Because "enhanced" is a relative term, the claimant must compare the injuries allegedly
caused by the defective design with the injuries he probably would have suffered had the
manufacturer used an equally feasible design. Only those injuries that are greater than the
injuries that would have resulted had a proper design been used are compensable as enhanced injuries. Id.
77. O'Donnell, supra note 42, at 339; Hoenig, supra note 2, at 692. Mr. Hoenig explains that a claimant must prove that the alleged defect proximately caused enhanced
injury; there must be a nexus between the defect and the injuries incurred. "Generally, the
existence of such a nexus is proved through a showing that if a .different design had been
used, enhanced injuries would not have occurred." Id.
78. Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 45, at 1276; see also Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk
A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying New York law).
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and policy underpinnings justifying application of the theory, which
has resulted in an increasing uncertainty in the law and an unwarranted increase in the scope of the manufacturer's liability.79 Fox v.
Ford Motor Co.80 is often relied upon as a seminal case in support of
the so-called "substantial factor" approach.81 In Fox, two rear-seat
passengers were killed in a head-on collision with a truck which had
crossed over the center line on an icy road.82 Both passengers were
wearing lap belts and received fatal abdominal and spinal injuries.
The plaintiffs alleged that the design of the rear seat belts was defective in both the angle of the lap belts and the absence of shoulder
belts.S3 The defendant manufacturer argued that the lap belts were
properly positioned and that the severity of the injuries was due to the
high speed of the crash.84
In affirming jury verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs, the Fox court
determined that Wyoming would adopt the enhanced injury doctrine
but rejected Huddell as refusing to follow orthodox principles of joint
liability of concurrent tortfeasors for injuries which flow from their
concurring in a single impact.85 The court saw no difference between
an enhanced injury case and one in which a passive tortfeasor and an
active tortfeasor "cooperate" to produce an injury.86 Citing section
433A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts*7 the court held that dam79. Clark, supra note 75, at 812; Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 45, at 1272.
80. 575 R2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978) (applying Wyoming law).
81. The phrase "substantial factor" is actually nothing more than the stock language
which is set out in the general proximate cause instruction given by federal courts in ordinary tort cases. Harris, supra note 4, at 658 n.108.
82. Fox, 575 F.2d at 777.
83. Id at 778.
84. la\
85. Id at 787.
86. Id
87. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A provides:
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause
to a single harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or more
causes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965).

Comment i explains further.
Certain kinds of harm, by their very nature, are normally incapable of any logical,
reasonable or practical division
By far the greater number of personal injuries, and of harms to tangible property, are . . . single and indivisible. Where two
or more causes combine to produce such a single result, incapable of division on
any logical or reasonable basis, and each is a substantial factor in bringing about
the harm, the courts have refused to make an arbitrary apportionment for its own
sake, and each of the causes is charged with responsibility for the entire harm.
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ages are to be apportioned between the two tortfeasors "if there are
distinct harms or a reasonable basis for deteirmining the causes of
injury/'88
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals thus held that once a plaintiff
shows that the alleged design defect was a substantial factor in producing injuries over and above those which would have resulted absent the defect, the burden shifts to the manufacturer to "apportion"89
the injuries if possible. Yet the court further reasoned that apportionment is neither appropriate nor possible where an injury is "indivisible/*90 such as death or paralysis, and in that case, the defendants will
be jointly and severally liable for all injuries.91
Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk A.G.92 is another case often relied
upon in support of the view that a plaintiff need only prove that the
alleged defect was a substantial factor in producing enhanced injuries
before the burden of proof of enhancement shifts to the defendant
manufacturer. In Mitchell, an unrestrained front-seat passenger was
ejected from the car in which he was riding as it left the road, struck
an embankment and overturned.93 The driver, who was not ejected,
suffered only minor injuries, while Mitchell was rendered a paraplegic.94 The plaintiff asserted that he was ejected through the passenger
door which had a defectively designed door latch and was rendered a
paraplegic after his ejection from the vehicle. The defendant manufacturer countered that Mitchell was ejected through the rear window,
rather than the passenger door, and suffered the paraplegic injury
while still in the vehicle during the rollover.
On appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff which apportioned damages between the driver and the manufacturer, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the jury should
not have been allowed to apportion an indivisible injury such as paraplegia.95 If the plaintiff is able to show that a design defect was a
substantial factor in producing an indivisible injury, the manufacturer
should be jointly and severally liable for all damages. Despite its recognition that the manufacturer in an enhanced injury case should only
Id § 433A cmt. i, at 43£-40.
88. Fox, 575 R2d at 787.
89. See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text regarding the falsity of the "apportionment** and "indivisibility" issues.
90. See infra notes 121-25.
91. Fox, 575 E2d at 787.
92. 669 E2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Minnesota law).
93. Id. at 1201.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1201-02.
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be liable for the enhanced injuries, the court held that the plaintiff
should not bear the burden of proving that the manufacturer was the
"sole cause" of the enhanced injury.96
The Mitchell court indicated that its primary difficulty with Huddell and its progeny was with forcing the parties and the jury "to try a
hypothetical case/'97 Thus, the court characterized the HuddellCaiazzo approach as "proving the impossible."98
Although the Fox-Mitchell approach has been followed,99 it has
also been criticized on the ground that it is an erosion of the principles
asserted in Larsen and unfairly extends manufacturers* potential liability far beyond enhanced injury to all injury sustained in an accident
which the manufacturer played no part in creating.100 Importantly,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, seeking to clarify its previous
holding in Fox, substantially modified that decision in Harvey v. General Motors Corp,101
In Harvey, the plaintiff suffered an amputated leg and brain damage when the 1979 Chevrolet Corvette in which he was riding swerved
from the road at high speed and rolled over. Harvey alleged that the
Corvette's "T-Top" roof panels separated from the car during the rollover, allowing him to be ejected and causing his injuries. Although
96.

Mat 1203.

97. la\ at 1204. C/. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 246 (2d Cir.
1981); supra note 69-73 and accompanying text. The Caiazzo court was similarly concerned that the Fox-Mitchell approach forces the manufacturer to show a "plethora of hypothetical and speculative possibilities," forces the manufacturer to prove a part of the
plaintiffs case, and allows the jury to engage in undue speculation which tempts them to
assign liability on the basis of the deep pockets of the manufacturer. Caiazzoy 647 F.2d at
246.
98. Mitchell, 669 F.2d at 1203.
99. See, e.g., Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418,424 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Texas law); McLeod v. American Motors Corp., 723 ¥2d 830, 833-34 (11th Cir. 1984)
(applying Florida law); Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 590 F.2d 215,217 (7th Cir. 1978) (applying Wisconsin law); Smith v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc., 556 F>2d 728,730 (5th Cir. 1977)
(applying Florida law); Richardson v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 552 F. Supp. 73, 83 (W.D.
Mo. 1982); Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 646 P2d 1020,1024 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982);
Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 398 A.2d 490,500 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 410 A.2d 1039 (Md. 1980);
Lee v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 688 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Okla. 1984); Sumnicht v. Toyota
Motor Sales USA, Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2,10 (Wis. 1984); Maskrey v. Volkswagenwerk A.G.,
370 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985); Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123,
1131 (Wyo. 1978).
100. See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 21.04[4], at 21-35; Levenstam & Lapp,
supra note 19; Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 45, at 1267-68; Clark, supra note 75, at 820,824
("Mitchell illustrates the mental gymnastics in which courts engage when forced to interpret [the] words [of Larsen].n).
101. 873 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying Wyoming law).
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the jury found that the vehicle was defective, that General Motors was
negligent, and that the defect caused the plaintiffs injuries, it did not
award plaintiff any damages, apparently believing that Harvey "did
not establish the extent of enhanced injuries attributable to the defective design of the Corvette . . . ."102
The court of appeals upheld this verdict, finding that Harvey had
not sustained his burden of proving enhancement because he never
established that his injuries were over and above those which would
have been sustained had the T-Top remained in place.103 The court
went on to criticize misinterpretations of the Fox decision, stating: "In
our view, Fox does not tell us that afindingof causation necessitates
an award of damages. Rather, Fox permits apportionment of damages
if there are distinct harms or there is a reasonable basis for determining the causes of injury."104
Consequently, Harvey reveals that it is not enough to prove that a
defect caused or was a "substantial factor" in producing an injury. A
plaintiff must prove that a defect caused injury "over and above" the
injury that probably would have occurred absent the alleged defect.105
Thus, a plaintiff must prove the injury that "probably would have occurred."106 As one commentator has stated, "i1 is not unreasonable to
read [the Harvey] opinion as requiring the plaintiff to prove the damages he would have suffered but for the injury enhancing defect, moving the Tenth Circuit closer to HuddelVs third element of proof than
to Fox"™1 Others also view Harvey as marking "a critical shift in the
weight of authority and a reaffirmation of traditional requirements of
proof, both quantitative and qualitative."108 Thus, reliance on what
has been labeled the "Fox-Mitchell" approach is misplaced.
Moreover, the Fox-Mitchell analysis is flawed in that it allows a
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case despite inadequate and speculative proof of proximate cause.109 It is this gross assumption that liability has already been fixed that supports the application of
traditional principles of concurrent tortfeasors and joint and several
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. ait 1348.
Id. alt 1350.
Id. ait 1349.
Id. (citing Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503).
Winner, supra note 75.

107.

FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 21.04[3], at 21-44 n.66.

108. O'Donnell, supra noie 42, at 328.
109. See Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 45, at 1267; Clark, supra note 75, at 827; see also
Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 19, at 79-80, 82 ("Liability without fault never was intended to be construed as liability without causation.").
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liability to neatly resolve the issue of apportionment.110 However, the
analogy completely ignores the fact that a finding of defect in an enhanced injury case must include the jury's determination that defined,
specific injuries were unreasonably enhanced.111 In other words, in
enhanced injury cases, proof of causation and proof of enhancement
are inseparable.112 The substantial factor approach, while requiring
proof of a reasonable alternative design, does not require proof of the
extent of the plaintiffs injuries absent the alleged defect. Thus, the
approach does not require actual proof of enhancement, thereby relieving the plaintiff of the burden of proving a causal relationship between the defect and the injury, effectively removing the element of
causation, and leaving the plaintiff's case in a morass of speculation.113
While some argue that the concern the Fox-Mitchell approach expresses for plaintiffs faced with difficult issues of proof is legitimate,
equally legitimate is the concern that enhanced injury defendants receive fair treatment through the weeding out of those cases lacking a
sufficient evidentiary foundation.114 Attacks on the Huddell-Caiazzo
approach often revolve around a perceived difficulty of plaintiffs in
retaining and compensating the expert witnesses usually necessary to
prove an enhanced injury claim.115 Such arguments are exaggerated
and unfounded. Case law illustrates that plaintiffs do succeed in satisfying the standards enunciated by Huddell and Caiazzo.116 Indeed, no
commentator has offered evidence that any deserving plaintiff has lost

110. Clark, supra note 75, at 827; Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 19, at 82.
111. See Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 19, at 82; Clark, supra note 75, at 827.
112. Foland, supra note 4, at 612; Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 19, at 76, 83-34.
113. See Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 19, at 80.
114. See Harris, supra note 4, at 659 n.118; Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 45, at 1267.
Mr. Harris further notes that the plaintiffs burden of proving the extent of enhancement is
not impossible or unfair, the theoretical underpinnings of the enhanced injury concept create a practicable balance between the interests of plaintiffs and defendants. Harris, supra
note 4, at 663.
115. In an enhanced injury case, expert testimony \s normally required in areas such as
occupant kinematics, biomechanics, human impact tolerance, accident reconstruction, engineering, medicine, etc. See Foland, supra note 4, at 617; Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 45,
at 1277. In order to present a jury issue, it is not sufficient to merely present expert testimony that the accident was "survivable" absent the defect or that the injury ."probably"
would have been reduced by a design change. See Foland, supra note 4, at 617.
116. See O'Donnell, supra note 42, at 334 n.51; see also Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A.G.,
648 F.2d 833,845 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981) (applying the Huddell standard
to alternative design, injury causation, and injury enhancement evidence).
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a specific case for lack of an expert witness over the past twenty
years.117
Argument about the difficulty the plaintiff faces in proving a hypothetical case is equally unfounded. In products liability litigation,
both plaintiffs and defendants routinely retain experts who are able to
reach opinions about hypothetical injuries.118 Thus, the assertion that
juries are unable to perform the complex calculations required to
evaluate and separate enhanced injuries is ludicrous.119 The venerable Larsen court was not concerned about this fair requirement of
proof. Recognizing that identification of enhanced injuries or damages may at times be difficult, the court nevertheless stated that the
obstacles are not insurmountable, noting that similar apportionments
are performed with regularity under comparative negligence
statutes.1^
The concepts of "apportionment" and "indivisible injury/' borrowed by the Fox-Mitchell approach from anachronistic principles of
concurrent tortfeasor liability, are simply not applicable in an enhanced injury case.121 This is because the very nature of the relief
sought by the plaintiff must be based on the divisibility of the injury.
117. O'Donnell, supra note 42, at 345. (pointing out that whatever was true years ago,
today products liability litigation offers great monetary rewards to the plaintiffs bar and its
allied experts).
118. An example of this may be seen in the assertion of the seat belt defense where
defendants are regularly required to prove the hypothetical injuries which would have occurred had the plaintiff been wearing a seat belt and to compare those to the injuries
actually received. See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 21.04[4], at 21-52. See generally Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G , 647 F.2d 241 (2d Ciir. 1981).
119. Indeed, the performance of such apportionment calculations is far more common
today than it was in 1968 at the time of Larsen. Juries have little difficulty with either the
fact or the reality of assessing comparative fault among parties using numerous different
formulae. See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 2l.04[l], at 21-35 n.7, § 21.04(4), at
21-52.
120. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503.
Triers of fact are allowed to make similar inexact determinations in returning
awards in personal injury cases involving pain and suffering, in resolving wrongful
death cases in which young children's net lifetime earnings are projected, in setting condemnation awards, in making comparative negligence determinations,
and in business interruption and lost profits lawsuits in which the trier hypothetically must determine what profits would have been earned absent the defendant's
wrongful conduct.
Harris, supra note 4, at 664-65. Perhaps use of the term "apportionment" was an unfortunate choice by the Larsen court in that it has bred a great deal of confusion among courts
struggling to determine exactly what must be apportioned. See infra notes 121-25 and
accompanying text.
121. See Hoenig, supra note 2, at 704. "When viewed in [its] elemental form, the plaintiffs enhancement burden of proof is nothing more than a requirement to prove that which
he is claiming: that 'fewer* or 'lesser' injuries would have occurred with a different design.
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The apportionment that is demanded is not a division among the total
injuries which the plaintiff sustained, but rather a showing of the difference between the injuries actually incurred and the injuries that
would have resulted in the accident absent the alleged defect.122 Or,
as Michael Hoenig has argued for many years, the debate over the
apportionment or the indivisibility of death or paralysis is a false controversy and a basic conceptual error.123 The manufacturer cannot be
liable for the entire harm under any theory. Instead the plaintiff must
show some basis for a comparison of the actual injury to that different
and lesser harm which would have occurred had the design been different. If the plaintiff does not supply that proof, then a basic element
of the tort is lacking.124
For the same reasons, section 433B(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is inapplicable because it merely speaks to the situation
of proven multiple tortfeasors apportioning total harm among themselves and does not relate to the plaintiffs burden of proving enhanced injuries.125 Section 433B was drafted in the context of joint
and several liability and was designed to ease the plaintiffs burden of
proof at a time when comparative negligence on the part of the plaintiff would bar recovery. In light of the widespread adoption of comparative fault principles, such rules are no longer necessary.
Placing the burden of proving enhancement on the manufacturer
encourages litigation because every auto accident injury is in reality a
"second collision" injury, prompting plaintiffs with nothing to lose to
join manufacturers as defendants in every case.126 The nuisance value
of such claims is also increased when defendants must bear the risk of
failing to sustain the burden of enhancement. In addition, even in the
face of speculative proof, defendants are forced to bear the costs of
expensive accident reconstruction and medical testimony. Increased
litigation and long, complex trials result in increased costs and strain
The plaintiffs burden, therefore, is not one of apportioning harms or dividing up injuries
" Id.
122. Hoenig, supra note 2, at 704; see also Levenstaro & Lapp, supra note 19, at 84
(arguing that the plaintiff cannot have it both ways by relying on the divisibility of the
injury in order to establish liability against the manufacturer for the enhanced injuries, but
then arguing that the injury is indivisible in order to hold the manufacturer jointly and
severally liable for the entire harm).
123. Hoenig, supra note 2, at 700-01 n.292,703-05; O'Donneil, supra note 42, at 336.
As Hoenig argues, it is understandable that judges have found the apportionment of death
or paralysis between a first and second collision difficult since such apportionment was
never in issue in the first place. Hoenig, supra note 2, at 700-01 n.292.
124. Hoenig, supra note 2, at 703-05; O'Donneil, supra note 42, at 336.
125. Hoenig, supra note 2, at 704-05.
126. O'Donneil, supra note 42, at 352 n.117; Reichert, supra note 42, at 116.
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on the already overburdened judicial system. All of these costs, naturally termed "indirect insurance" by some, are ultimately passed on to
consumers and taxpayers.127
4. Comparative Fault
A second area of controversy in enhanced injury theory arises
surrounding the applicability of the defense of comparative fault. The
modern trend in products liability is toward consolidating defenses
and allowing the unitary defense of comparative fault as an awardreducing, rather than an absolute, defense.128 In enhanced injury
cases, it is widely accepted that a plaintiffs fault which is a proximate
cause of enhanced injury,129 such as failure to wear a seatbelt, should
always be compared to a defendant manufacturer's injury-enhancing
fault.130 There is no debate over the conclusion that the responsibility
to use reasonable care to ensure that injuries are not enhanced applies
equally to both manufacturers and consumers.131
The controversy arises over whether a plaintiff's accident-causing
fault should also be compared to a defendant manufacturer's injuryenhancing fault. Some jurisdictions and commentators have taken the
position that a plaintiffs negligence in causing an accident cannot be
compared to a defendant's injury-enhancing fault.132 They argue that
127. O'Donnell, supra note 42, at 352 n.117; Reichert, supra note 42, at 116.
128. Harris, supra note 4, at 672-73; Reichert, supra note 42, at 122; Shad, supra note
58, at 1340. But see Kupetz v. Deere & Co., 644 A.2d 1213,1221 (Pa. Super. Q . 1994)
(finding that a plaintiffs contributory negligence may not be utilized to apportion fault
between the plaintiff and defendant in an enhanced injury or any other type of products
liability action). Some states do still allow the assertion of affirmative defenses such as
misuse. See States v. R.D. Werner Co., 799 P.2d 427, 430 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
that if misuse was sole cause of plaintiffs injuries, plaintiff cannot recover under strict
products liability theory).
129. A plaintiff has injury-enhancing fault when he fails to conduct himself in a reasonable manner to avoid unnecessary injury in the event of an accident, or, in other words,
when a plaintiff s action or inaction is a contributing proximate cause of his enhanced injuries. Reichert, supra note 42, at 120.
130. See Poland, supra note 4, at 620; Harris, supra note 4, at 674; Reichert, supra note
42, at 117; Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 45, at 1280-84; Shad, supra note 58, at 1340; see
also MacDonald v. Genera! Motors Corp., 784 F. Supp. 486, 500 (M.D. Ttenn. 1992) (finding evidence of plaintiffs failure to wear seat belt admissible to support defendant's argument that the plaintiffs fault was the proximate cause of his injuries rather than the alleged
defect, notwithstanding state statute precluding seat belt defense as evidence of contributory negligence).
131. See Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 45, at 1280.
132. See Harris, supra note 4, at 672-73; Shad, supra note 5St at 1340; Reichert, supra
note 42, at 117-18,125; MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, reprinted in 44 Fed.

Reg. 62,714, at 62,736 (1979); see also Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224, 230 (Iowa
1992) (holding that evidence of driver's or plaintiff passenger's intoxication at time of acci-
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this result is implicit in the holding of Larsen which established a new
precedent by holding the manufacturer liable for enhanced injuries
even though the defect did not cause the initial accident.133
However, a careful analysis of case law and commentary demonstrates that a significant number of courts have concluded that all of a
plaintiffs fault must be compared to the injury-enhancing fault of the
product manufacturer as long as it can be established that the plaintiffs fault was a proximate cause of the enhanced injury.134 The reasons advanced for this position include the fact that the defense of
comparative fault is a consideration distinct from the plaintiffs burden of proving causation of the injuries. With proper instruction, juries have no difficulty in assigning percentages of causal fault—
whether it be accident-causing or injury-enhancing—to all parties
whose conduct proximately contributed to the plaintiffs injuries. In
addition, refusing to allow comparison of all of a plaintiffs negligent
conduct foists extraordinary hardships on enhanced injury defendants
who are singled out among tortfeasors for discriminatory application
of proximate cause and comparative fault principles.135
In practice, because of the laws of physics and principles of energy management, it is often difficult to distinguish between so-called
"accident-causing" and "injury-enhancing" conduct. The enhancement of injuries runs hand in hand with the severity of the accident.
For example, each incremental increase in speed results in a corresponding increase in crash consequences because the forces unleashed
in the crash are magnified exponentially.136 Thus, any conduct which
influences the severity of an accident, thereby constituting a proximate
dent is inadmissible because plaintiffs or driver's comparative fault is not relevant in an
enhanced injury case unless it is a proximate cause of the enhanced injury).
133. See Reichert, supra note 42, at 118. Mr. Reichert further explains that the comparison of accident-causing fault and injury-enhancing fault contradicts Larsen and the axioms on which enhanced injury liability rests by erroneously basing the manufacturer's
liability on the proximate causation of the initial accident rather than on the proximate
causation of the enhanced injuries. He believes that accident-causing fault, while dearly a
cause-in-fact of enhanced injuries, is not the proximate cause of such injuries. Id. at 125;
see also MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, at

62,736 (1979) (discussing proximate causation versus causation in fact in enhanced injury
cases).
134. See Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 890 F.2d 1540,1550 (10th Cir. 1989), cert
denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993); Harvey v. General Motors Corp.r873 F2d 1343,1349 (10th
Cir. 1989); Michael rioenig, The American Law Institute Restatement Draft, N.Y. LJ., May
9,1994, at 3, 6-7; John M. Thomas, Comparative Fault in Crashworthiness or Second Collision Cases, 22 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 540, 541-42 (May 20,1994).
135. See Thomas, supra note 134, at 54.
136. Hoenig, supra note 134, at 6.
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cause of enhanced injury, should be compared with a manufacturer's
fault.
Finally, public policy dictates that all of the plaintiffs conduct
contributing to enhanced injuries be considered in allocating fault
Driver misconduct, such as driving while intoxicated or under the influence of drugs, must be deterred through the application of comparative fault rules, regardless of the type of tortfeasor the plaintiff
chooses to pursue.137
D.

Recent Decisions and Trends

Enhanced injury 'cases decided over the past two years clearly
demonstrate that the controversial burden of proof issue continues to
cause substantial difficulty for courts. The divisive Huddell-CaiazzoFox-Mitchell split appears irreconcilable at this stage in the development of enhanced injury theory. However, at least over thfe last two
years, it is arguable that more jurisdictions have issued opinions supporting the Huddell-Caiazzo approach than the Fox-Mitchell approach.138 It remains to be seen whether this trend will continue.
L

Pro Fox-Mitchell

The Illinois Court of Appeals recently adopted the Fox-Mitchell
substantial factor approach in Oakes v. General Motors Corp.139 The
plaintiff in Oakes, who was not wearing a seat belt, was paralyzed
when his 1982 Chevrolet Camaro was rear-ended at a traffic light by a
pickup truck with a snow plow bracket mounted on its front end.140
The plaintiff brought suit against the driver of the pickup and General
Motors, alleging that a defect in the seat mechanism allowed the
driver's seatback to collapse upon impact, causing his paralysis, an indivisible injury. On appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff,
the Illinois Appellate Court held that concepts of enhanced injury do
not apply when a plaintiffs injury is indivisible and evidence supports
a finding that each defendant proximately caused the plaintiff s injury.
Under these circumstances, defendants will be held jointly and severally liable for the entirety of the harm.141 The court rejected the Hud137. Hoenig, supra note 134, at 6; Thomas, supra note 134, at 54.
138. The Reporters for the new Restatement (Third) have taken the position that most
cases supporting the Huddell position are dated. See Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5,
§11 cmt. d, at 275-76. An analysis of recent case law, however, demonstrates that this
assertion is unfounded. See infra notes 152-63 and accompanying text.
139. 628 N.E.2d 341 (111. App. Ct. 1993).
140. Id. at 342.
141. Id. at 347-48.
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dell standard as being a "nearly insurmountable burden/* and instead
voiced its support of the Mitchell substantial factor approach.142
Shortly after the Oakes decision, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals applied Illinois law in DePaepe v. General Motors Corp.143
In this case, the plaintiff also was paralyzed when his 1984 Buick Regal was struck on the passenger side by another car. The plaintiff
brought suit against the manufacturer, arguing that the sun visorheader system was defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous.144 Relying on Oakes, the Seventh Circuit reversed a jury verdict
in General Motors' favor, agreeing with DePaepe's argument that the
trial court erred in instructing the jury on enhanced injury because he
suffered a single, indivisible injury incapable of apportionment. The
court of appeals held that the trial court should have first determined
as a matter of law whether the plaintiffs injury was indivisible and
then instructed the jury that if it found the alleged defect was a substantial factor in producing the injury, it should return a verdict for the
plaintiff.145
The Nebraska Supreme Court also recently adopted the FoxMitchell substantial factor approach in Kudlacek v. Fiat S.p.A.146 The
plaintiff, having sustained disabling head injuries in a rollover accident, alleged that the Rat Xl-9 he was riding in was defectively
designed because it did not provide adequate passenger protection in
rollover or side impact collisions. The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed Hat's directed verdict on the enhanced injury claims, holding
that under Nebraska law, proof of a reasonable alternative design
which would have resulted in less severe injuries is no longer required
for a claimant to recover under a claim of defective design.147 In addition, the court found that "the substantial factor standard harmonizes
with Nebraska law" of proximate causation, and that the plaintiff had
presented adequate proof under the substantial factor test to submit
his enhanced injury claim to the jury.148 _
Similarly, in Hansen v. Crown Controls Corp.,149 the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals applied the Fox-Mitchell substantial factor approach
142. Id. at 348-49.
143. 33 F3d 737 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Illinois law).
144. Id. at 738.
145. Mat 742.
146. 509 N.W2d 603, 612 (Neb. 1994).
147. M a t 611.
148. Id. at 611-12.
149. 512 N.W.2d 509, 514 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993), vacated in part on other grounds, 519
N.W.2d 346 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
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consistent with prior Wisconsin decisions on enhanced injury.150
However, the court emphasized that the jury's apportionment of causation for separately produced injuries under an enhanced injury theory remains consistent with Wisconsin law.151
2. Pro Huddell-Caiazzo
Several recent state and federal court decisions applying Pennsylvania law reaffirm that state's commitment to the Huddell-Caiazzo
burden of proof approach. In Kupetz v.* Deere & Co.,152 a Pennsylvania state court finally formally recognized the enhanced injury
theory as a viable "subset of a products liability action" under Pennsylvania law.153 Kupetz involved a John Deere bulldozer which was
alleged to be defective and unreasonably dangerous due to lack of a
rollover protection system. On appeal from a judgment in favor of
defendants, the court held that although enhanced injury is a viable
theory of recovery which requires the claimant to prove each of the
three Huddell elements, the operator's assumption of the risk in this
case completely barred his recovery.154
Likewise, the New Jersey Superior Court has recently explicitly
affirmed that the Huddell doctrine applies to enhanced injury cases
decided under New Jersey law.155 In McLaughlin v. Nissan Motor
150. See Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2,11 (Wis. 1984);
Maskrey v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 370 N.WJZd 815, 821 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
151. Hansen, 512 N.W.2d at 514 (emphasis added).
152. 644 A.2d 1213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
153. Id at 1215,1218.
154. Id. at 1218-22. For additional recent case law demonstrating Pennsylvania's support of the Huddell approach, see Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 36 F3d 278,284 (3d Cir.
1994) (recognising Kupetz decision and predicting Pennsylvania Supreme Court would follow its views); Kolesar v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 815 F. Supp. 818, 821 (M.D. Pa.
1992) (stating (hat the Huddell approach was adopted in Habecker), affd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d
Cir. 1993); Dorsett v. American Isu2u Motors, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 1212, 1218 (E.D. Pa.)
(stating the plaintiff must prove three Huddell elements to prevail), affd, 977 F.2d 567 (3d
Cir. 1992); Harries v. General Motors Corp., 786 F. Supp. 446,449 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that the manufacturer and the driver of car in which the plaintiff was injured are not
joint tortfeasors and the manufacturer cannot sustain third party complaint against the
driver where the plaintiff is only seeking damages for his enhanced injuries); Craigie v.
General Motors Corp., 740 F. Supp. 353,361 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that Huddell governs
the burden of proof until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court speaks on the issue); Mills v.
Ford Motor Co., 142 F.R.D. 271, 273 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that the plaintiff had the
burden of establishing the three Huddell elements).
155. McLaughlin v. Nissan Motor Corp., 630 A.2d 857, 860 (N J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1993). New Jersey's commitment to Huddell was questioned by the Restatement (Third)
Reporters in their analysis of case law on the burden of proof issue. See Council Draft No.
2, supra note 5, § 11 cmt. d, at 267-78.
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Corp.?56 the court held that the plaintiffs action alleging inadequate
padding of the A-pillar should have been dismissed because the plaintiff failed to sustain her burden of proof of enhancement under Huddell151 Significantly, the plaintiffs medical expert admitted on crossexamination that he was unable to quantify the injury the plaintiff
would have received if the A-pillar had been adequately padded, except to say that it would have been less serious.158
In an unpublished decision applying Kentucky law, the Sixth Circuit recently adopted the Huddell-Caiazzo approach. In O'Bryan v.
Volkswagen of America?59 the plaintiff alleged that defects in the door
latch and passive restraint system of his. 1987 Volkswagen Jetta caused
or contributed to his paraplegic injuries when he was ejected through
the driver's door during a rollover accident occurring at a speed in
excess of fifty-five miles per hour.160 The court of appeals reversed a
nearly six million dollar jury verdict in the plaintiffs favor and entered
judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the plaintiff had
failed to prove causation. Although the plaintiff suggested a "better"
passive restraint design, he did not establish that the alternative system would have prevented his injuries in this accident; nor did he propose a reasonable alternative design for a more crashworthy door
lock. The court expressly rejected the plaintiff's argument that his injuries were indivisible, noting Kentucky's statutory adoption of comparative fault which uses the same allocative process.161
In Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co.,162 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the defendant manufacturer
and held that the trial court did not err in giving a second collision
instruction requiring the plaintiff to prove that the alleged defect was
the sole cause of his enhanced injuries.163
156. 630 A.2d 857 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law, Div. 1993).
* 157. Id. at 861.
158. Id, at 859.
159. 39 F.3d 1182,1994 WL 599450 (6th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
160. Id. at *1.
161. Id. at *4 n.6.
162. 986 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying Missouri law).
163. Id. at 269 (reasoning that the plaintiffs failed to object to this instruction and also
offered a nearly identical instruction themselves). For other recent cases supporting the
Huddell approach, see Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224,228 (Iowa 1992) (holding
that the trial court erred by directing verdict for defendant when the plaintiff presented
sufficient evidence to reach jury on each of three Huddell elements); Hillrichs v. Avco
Corp., 478 N.W.2d 70,75 (Iowa 1991) (holding that the plaintiff offered sufficient evidence
under the Huddell test to reach the jury even though the extent of enhanced injury was not
fixed with certainty and the jury was not precluded from quantifying the enhanced loss
within a reasonable margin of error); Armstrong v. Lorino, 580 So. 2d 528, 530 (La. Ct.
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PROPOSED RESTATEMENT SECTION ON ENHANCED INJURY

The purpose of a Restatement is to promote greater certainty and
uniformity in the law by creating coherent rules and policies through
the codification of existing common law, while at the same time eliminating unnecessary complexities. It should be analytical, critical, and
constructive.164
Consistent with these goals, the Reporters for the Restatement
(Third)16S envisioned their task as one of "restating" section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts by changing the relevant language
to conform to current understandings, thereby clarifying much of the
confusion that has arisen over the years.166 The Reporters further emphasized that:
We have . . . chosen a moderate approach in drafting our suggested revision. We intend to stay as close as possible to shared
perceptions of the evolved meanings of the original section and
its comments. We do not fancy ourselves as radical reformers,
although we express preferences, based on widely recognized
normative criteria, when choices are appropriate. Finally, we
propose to identify those areas in which true controversy reigns
and in which neither predictions nor recommendations are in
order.167
The Reporters clearly recognized that a restatement should accurately reflect the law as it has developed and attempt to clarify areas
of confusion and inconsistency. A restatement of the law should also
attempt to be impartial, logical, and internally consistent.
However, in contradiction to their announced intentions, the Reporters have proposed the following black letter section on enhanced
injury:
Increased Harm Due to Product Defect
(a) When a product is defective within the meaning of § 2
and the defect is a substantial factor in increasing the
App. 1991) (holding that the plaintiff is required to prove existence of defect and extent of
enhancement; directed verdict in favor of defendant affirmed where expert evidence established that injuries would have occurred regardless of defective seat latch); Garcia v. Rivera, 553 N.Y.S2d 378, 380 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding that defendant's motion for
summary judgment should have been granted where plaintiff failed to demonstrate his
ability to meet the Huddell three-prong test).
164. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1934), Introduction at vii-ix; James F. Byrne, Jr.,
Reevaluation of the Restatement as a Source of Law in Arizona, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 1021,
1022-23 (1973).
165. Tlie Reporters for this revision are Aaron D. Twerski of Brooklyn Law School
and James A. Henderson, Jr. of Cornell Law School.
166. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512,1513 (1992).

167. Id.
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harm suffered by the plaintiff beyond the harm that
would have resultedfromnondefect-related causes, the
product seller is subject to liability for the increased
harm,
(b) If proof supports the apportionment of liability among
responsible actors, the extent of the seller's liability is
determined according to such proof and is limited to
the increased harm,
(c) If proof does not support apportionment of liability,
then the product seller is liable for all of the harm suffered by the plaintiff from both the defect and the other
causes,
(d) A seller of a defective product who is held liable for
part of the harm suffered by the plaintiff under the rule
stated in Subsection (b), or all the harm suffered by the
plaintiff under the rule stated in Subsection (c), is
jointly and severally liable with all other parties who
bear legal responsibility for causing the harm, determined by applicable rules of joint and several
liability.1^
A.

Reasonable Alternative Design

By referring to the definition of defect contained in section 2, 169
the proposed Restatement (Third) section on enhanced injury properly
requires the plaintiff to prove the existence of a design defect through
proof of a reasonable alternative design which would have reduced or
168. Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 11, at 253.
169. Section 2 of Council Draft No. 2 of the Restatement (Third) provides:
For purposes of determining liability under § 1:
(a) a product contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs
from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in
the preparation and marketing of the product;
(b) a product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed
by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a
reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the
alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe;
(c) a product is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or
warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the instructions or
warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.
Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 2, at 13-14.
In relying on § 2, yet shifting the burden of proof of enhancement to the defendant
based on inapplicable rules pertaining to concurrent tortfeasors, the Reporters have created a contradiction between sections which many courts will struggle with in the future.
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eliminated the enhanced injuries sustained.170 In addition, the Reporters make clear in their comments that the reasonableness of a
given design is properly determined through a balancing of elements
of risk against elements of utility.171 The overall safety of the entire
product must be considered, and it is not sufficient that the alternative
design would have reduced or prevented the harm suffered by the
plaintiff if it would result in an increase of other dangers of equal or
greater magnitude.172 The draft Restatement {Third) has expressly
recognized, as have many courts and commentators,173 that a negligence-based reasonableness standard is the only fair method by which
to judge alleged design defects.174
B.

Scope of Duty

The body of proposed section 11 does not contain a statement of
the duty giving rise to enhanced injury liability. The Reporters' conception of that duty, however, does appear in comment a which states:
"A manufacturer has a duty to design and manufacture its product so
as reasonably to reduce the foreseeable harm that may occur in an accident brought about by causes other than defect/'175
When the Reporters' conception of this duty is compared to the
duty described in Larsen*76 it is glaringly apparent that the Restatement (Third) duty is much broader in scope. Indeed, this is just the
sort of expansion of duty that the Dreisonstok court was concerned
about when it warned twenty years ago that "[fjoreseeability... is not
to be equated with duty."177
Forcing the enhanced injury duty to cover all "foreseeable" accident situations is an unwarranted expansion of the enhanced injury
doctrine, has no basis in the law and leads to absolute liability. Thus,
although black letter subsection (a) of the enhanced injury section is
170. See also Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, $ 11 cmt; b, at 256 (emphasizing that
the reasonable alternative design must reduce harm).
171. Id. § 2 cmt. c, at 22, § 11 cmt b, at 256-57. A risk-utility balancing test fairly takes
into account such factors as the magnitude of foreseeable risks of harm, instructions and
warnings accompanying the product, the nature and strength of consumer expectations, the
effects of the alternative design on costs of production and product function, the relative
advantages and disadvantages of proposed safety features, product longevity, maintenance
and repair, esthetics, and marketability. Id. § 2 cmt. d, at 28-29.
172. Id. § 2 cmt. d, at 29, § 11 cmt. b, at 256-57.
173. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
174. Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5: § 2 cmt. a, at 15-19, cmt. d, at 28-34.
175. Id. § 11 cmt. a, at 254 (emphasis added).
176. Larsen imposed a duty to use reasonable care in design to protect against unreasonable risks of injury or enhancement of injury. 391 F.2d at 504 (emphasis added).
177. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1070 (4th Cir. 1974).
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an accurate statement of enhanced injury theory as applied by many
jurisdictions, the scope of the duty described in the comment goes way
beyond the duty contemplated in Larsen and must be scaled back.
C

Shift in Burden of Proof

The most troubling aspect of the proposed Restatement (Third)
section on enhanced injury is that it has the practical effect of shifting
the burden of proof of the extent of enhanced injury to the defendant
once the plaintiff has shown that the alleged defect was a "substantial
factor" in increasing the plaintiffs harm, thus adopting the Fox-Mitchell approach- Although black letter subsections (b) and (c) do not
formally shift this burden, the Reporters explicitly advocate such a
shift in their comments and note.178
In their note, the Reporters engage in a detailed discussion of
case law and conclude that a "strong majority" of courts that have
considered the issue have adopted a rule supporting the draft Restatement (Third) position. As much of the above discussion illustrates,
however, the burden of proof issue remains extremely divisive, with
recent decisions being almost evenly split. No "majority" position has
yet emerged. In fact, most states have not yet directly addressed the
issue.
Furthermore, in their case analysis, the Reporters mischaracterize
many states as supportive of the Fox-Mitchell approach when their
case law either clearly does not support that approach or has not yet
addressed the issue. For example, although the New Jersey Superior
Court has expressly held that the Huddell standard governs enhanced
injury cases decided under New Jersey law,179 the Reporters question
New Jersey's commitment to Huddell and incredibly count New Jersey
as a state supporting the Fox-Mitchell approach.180 In another example of such mischaracterization, the Reporters include Indiana as supportive of the Fox-Mitchell approach even though a clear split of
authority exists in that state at the appellate court level.181 Colorado
is also characterized as strongly leaning toward the Fox-Mitchell camp
based on a 1980 successive collision case, Romero v. Parker,182 which
178. See Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 11, Reporters* Note to cmt. d, at 267-78.
179. See McLaughlin v. Nissan Motor Corp., 630 A.2d 857,860 (N J. Super. Ct. 1993).
180. See Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 11 Reporters* Note to cmt. d, at 267-78.
181. Compare Jackson v. Warrum, 535 N.E2d 1207,1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (adopting Fox-Mitchell approach) with Masterman v. Veldman's Equip., Inc., 530 N.E.2d 312, 318
(Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (adopting Huddell approach).
182. 619 P.2d 89, 90 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980).

HeinOnline - - 36 C. T s x . L. Rev. 447 1995

448

SOUTH TEXAS LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 36:417

held tortfeasors jointly and severally liable for the entire harm.183 The
Reporters fail to mention, however, that Colorado has since statutorily abolished joint and several liability and adopted comparative
fault,184 while also failing to acknowledge federal appellate court precedent imposing the burden of proving the extent of enhancement
upon the plaintiff under Colorado law.185
While acknowledging that "the product seller is responsible only
for the increased harm, and not for the harm that would have occurred even had the product been fully adequate/*186 and that "basic
principles of causation limit the damages to those resulting from the
increase in plaintiffs harm caused by the defect,"187 the Reporters
nonetheless fail to enforce these concepts through the proposed Restatement (Third). As discussed above, logically, a plaintiff must prove
the degree of enhancement in order to prove the existence of a defect
(/.e., the availability of a reasonable alternative design), and .causation.
It is simply not possible to show that a safer, reasonable alternative
design existed without showing what injuries could have been avoided
with that design.
The proposed Restatement (Third) section on enhanced injury
also relies on section 433B(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts*88
in justifying its shift in the burden of proof of enhancement and imposition of joint and several liability- As discussed above,189 however,
this reliance is misplaced. Comment d of the draft Restatement
(Third) states, "[djefendant, a proved wrongdoer who has in fact
183.

Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 11, Reporters* Note to cmt. d, at 268, 274.

184.

See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-21-406,13-21-1113 (1989 & Supp. 1994).

185. See Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 808,813 (10th Cir. 1981); TMoya v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 884 F.2d 1330,1339 (10th Cir. 1989). But see Mile Hi Concrete, Inc.
v. Matz, 842 P.2d 198, 201 n.17 (Colo. 1992) (disagreeing with the holding in Curtis). The
Reporters repeatedly cite questionable and irrelevant state precedent to predict that jurisdictions will adopt the Fox-Mitchell approach. For example, the Reporters cite Haft v.
Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465 (Ca). 1970), as indicating that California will eventually
shift the burden of proof of enhancement to the defendant,, in spite of the fact that the
California Court of Appeals expressly held that the Haft decision did not apply to enhanced injury cases and refused to shift the burden of proof of enhancement to the defendant in Endicott v. Nissan Motor Corp., 141 Cal. Rptr. 95,101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). The
Reporters rely similarly on an Arkansas successive collision case, Woodward v. Blyth, 462
S.W.2d 205,209 (Ark. 1971), and an Alaska case dealing with the burden of proving that
design benefits outweigh risks, Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 886 (Alaska
1979), to predict that these two states will follow Fox-MitchzH. Council Draft No. 2, supra
note 5, § 11, Reporters* Note to cmt. d, at 274.
186. Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 11 cmt a, at 254.
187. Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 11 cmt a, at 254.
188. See supra note 66 (providing the text of this section).
189. See supra note 125 and accompanying text
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caused harm to the plaintiff, should not escape liability because the
nature of the harm makes apportionment impossible."190 This oftcited argument refuses to recognize that the enhanced injury defendant cannot be a "proved wrongdoer" until the plaintiff has properly
proven the existence of a defect and causation, both of which require
a comparison of the injuries actually sustained with the injuries which
would have been sustained had the reasonable alternative design been
used.
Also misplaced is the Reporters* reliance on arguments of plaintiff hardships in retaining experts and proving hypothetical injuries, as
well as juror difficulty in evaluating such issues. In practice, plaintiffs,
as well as defendants, have no difficulty whatsoever in obtaining nonspeculative expert testimony to establish the hypothetical injuries
which would have occurred in an accident absent the alleged defect.
As discussed above, defendants are regularly required to prove such
hypotheticals in asserting the seat belt defense in those jurisdictions
where it is allowed. Likewise, juries have no difficulty comparing such
hypothetical injuries with those that actually occurred and making
similar determinations of damages. For example, triers of fact are allowed to make comparably inexact calculations in returning awards in
personal injury cases involving pain and suffering, in projecting lost
future earnings or lost profits, and in making comparative negligence
determinations.191 These arguments do not justify relieving plaintiffs
from the burden of proving that which they allege in an enhanced
injury case—that lesser injuries would have been sustained had a different design been used.
D.

Joint and Several Liability

Another troubling aspect of the proposed Restatement (Third)
provision on enhanced injury is its imposition of joint and several liability, under subsection (d), on product sellers found liable under subsections (b) or (c) for part or all of the harm suffered by a plaintiff.
The Reporters state in comment e that "[jjoint and several liability is
imposed because there is no practical method of apportioning liability
that would reflect the separate causal contributions of those who
caused the increased harm."192
The Restatement (Third) position does not take into account that
the trend in modern tort law is away from joint and several liability
190. Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 11 cmt. dt at 261 (emphasis added).
191. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
192. Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 11 cmt. e, at 262.
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and toward more equitable rules of comparative fault. Indeed, as the
Reporters also recognize, many states have statutorily abolished joint
and several liability in favor of some sort of comparative fault
system-193
If the Larsen principles are to be honored, an enhanced injury
defendant cannot be held liable, jointly and severaUy or otherwise, for
any harm beyond that which is proven to have been increased or aggravated by a product defect. As recognized by the Larsen court in
1968,194 the dilemma of the apportionment of indivisible injuries is
nonexistent when viewed from a practical perspective. Experts regularly provide such opinions and juries regularly perform similar apportionments in other contexts. Moreover, it is inequitable to allow
plaintiffs to rely on the divisibility inherent in the concept of "enhanced injuries" in order to assert a claim against a product seller, and
then argue that such injuries are indivisible in order to hold the product seller jointly and severally liable for all damages.195
E.

Comparative Fault

In Council Draft Number T\vo, the Reporters for the proposed
Restatement (Third) correctly recognize the majority view that all
types of plaintiff conduct proximately causing enhanced injury should
be compared with an enhanced injury defendant's injury-causing fault
in allocating responsibility for damages.196

193. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-21-406,13-21-111.5 (1989 & Supp. 1994).
194. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503-04.
195. See Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 19, at 84.
196. Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 11 crat f, a» 264 and Reporters' Note to cmt.
f, at 279-80. This conclusion was reached in the first Council Draft of the proposed Restatement (Third). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 105 cmt.

f, at 181-82 and Reporters* Note to cmt. f, at 210-14 (Council Draft No. 11993). However,
the Reporters then advocated the opposite view in Council Draft No. 1A and Tentative
Draft No. 1, arguing that a plaintiffs negligence in causing the initial accident should not
be considered in apportioning liability between the plaintiff and the product sellers unless
proof did not support apportionment of the injuries and the product sellers were held
jointly and severally liable for all injuries. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD-

UCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt f, at 97-99 and Reporters* Note to cmt f, at 214-18 (Council Draft
No. 1A, 1994); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. f, at

120-22 and Reporters' Note to cmt. f, at 140-43 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994). Further
debate followed this switch in position, prompting additional analysis of the issue, and
ultimately resulting in readoption of the majority view allowing comparison of all forms of
plaintiff fault.

H e m O n l m e - - 36 S

Tex L Rev 450 1995

1995]

REASSESSMENT

IV.

OF ENHANCED INJURY

451

CONCLUSION: TOWARD AN EQUITABLE APPROACH

While the enhanced injury doctrine is appropriately here to stay,
it should not result in enhanced liability for product manufacturers
which are more attentive to safety today than at any other time in
history.197 The current debate over the scope of the enhanced injury
duty or the burden of proof of enhancement ultimately comes down to
a question of fairness—fairness to those directly involved in enhanced
injury litigation as well as fairness to the consuming public. In those
difficult and sympathetic cases where seriously injured plaintiffs may
be unable to show the existence of a duty or to sustain their burden of
proof of enhancement, yet will need extensive care for the remainder
of their lives, is it fair that product manufacturers and sellers bear
these costs? Or are we allowing these difficult cases to misdirect the
law? The burden of proof of enhancement must be clarified and uniformly applied in a manner consistent with the doctrine's theoretical
underpinnings in order to make the entire theory workable. Such efforts will certainly result in greater uniformity and predictability in
this area of the law, with far-reaching benefits.
As some have pointed out, the law of products liability aims to
distribute the "loss" attributable to a product defect, not the total cost
of accidents.198 American manufacturers are already hobbled by the
enormous costs of liability insurance and products litigation. Beyond
question, these costs have had a detrimental effect on the ability of
many American industries to successfully compete in world markets,
and have even threatened the continued existence of some industries.
It is also likely that these costs have had a chilling effect on the incentives of manufacturers to create new products and new safety devices.199 The legal system, through the Restatement (Third), the
judiciary, and perhaps elected government officials, has an obligation
to address these considerations by developing a workable system of
products liability law which will compensate deserving plaintiffs, while
at the same time treating defendant product sellers and the public
fairly.
197. This increased focus on safety is itself in part the result of the development of
enhanced injury theory over the last three decades. It is also the result of many other
interrelated factors, such as the changing attitudes of the American public (also increasingly concerned with safety), and the growth and refinement of governmental safety organizations (such as the NHTSA, the FDA, and the FAA), wmVn now conduct sophisticated
testing and mandate minimum safety standards for numerous products and services.
198. O'Donnell, supra note 42, at 350.
199. Many enhanced injury cases are filed based on the development of new safety
devices, such as roll bars, air bags, etc., which wouid have reduced the plaintiffs injuries
had the device been developed and installed by the manufacturer earlier.
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